

Humanitarian Governance

Network, Agency and Power

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All errors, omissions and unfortunate typos are my own.

Abstract

The humanitarian field is being governed at a global level, but not by states. I investigate the implications of anarchy in the transnational governance of humanitarianism- as distinct from the interstate anarchy described in mainstream IR. The qualitative difference in the implications of anarchy necessitate an adaptation of familiar IR concepts. Diverging interests in the field of humanitarianism are mapped out- and a model of humanitarian agency produced. As humanitarian organisations have diverging interests as to how they desire humanitarian governance to develop- the process becomes political- and the question of power relevant. I test the applicability of relational power - the facets of power as presented in Social Network Analysis. The idea is tested as concept through a comparative analysis of four organisations- and as a formal construct against all organisations in the network of memberships- between humanitarian governance mechanisms and humanitarian organisations. I end with a critical re-examination of of both the concept and the construct- and their applicability to humanitarian governance in particular- and transnational governance in general.

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2 Introduction

Governance, by definition, implies power. As bread presupposes a baker; existence of the governed presupposes at least one governor. This is by no means an original thought in International Relations (IR), where the focus of the academic research is on how this can be accomplished under the conditions of anarchy and sovereignty. In recent years it has become more common to broaden the areas where this question is asked. While IR-scholars traditionally studied the power relations between states, an emerging new field has focused more on non-state actors, or transnational actors (TNAs). This literature has primarily focused on proving “to a states-centered picture of world politics that TNAs matter” (Risse 2007: 268). In this thesis I have no intention of engaging in this debate directly. Whether or not TNAs can impact world politics- against the interest of powerful states- is not directly relevant to my claim. What I propose is that there are areas of world politics where states are inactive. To be more precise, governance of actors from many different states is occurring- without state actors driving or controlling the process. I contend that the rapidly expanding governance structure for the humanitarian field is one such instance.

Handbooks are being written (Collaborative for Development Action 2004), universal operational standards are being set (The Sphere Project 2011), and treatise establishing common platforms are being signed (Global Humanitarian Platform 2007). While these rules, standards and treatise remain non-enforceable, much like the proliferating “soft law” among states (see Raustiala and Slaughter 2007: 551), there are indications that they have some influence over the actors they are intended to bind (see Gostelow 1999; Buchanan-Smith 2003; Stoddard 2003; McNamara 2006). Humanitarianism is being governed, but not by states or international organisations. It is being governed by the humanitarian organisations themselves. Intergovernmental, non-governmental, secular, and religious organisations, engaged in humanitarian action, are providing common governance mechanisms for themselves.

As I shall demonstrate, governance is emerging through a series of initiatives, intertwined in a complex web of connections and affiliations. Power, in this context, is

not given *a priori*. Conceptions of power, as defined by military force, security dilemmas, or absolute gains in the neo-realist and neo-liberalist schools of IR, lose their relevance. Humanitarian organisations have no armies with which they can wage war upon each other, nor do their financial assets bear direct relevance upon how they interact. They do not trade. While this field is being governed outside the jurisdiction of a singular sovereign entity, it is not happening within the context of the interstate anarchy. Humanitarian organisations are not sovereign. The only clear characteristic which is shared by the interstate and inter-humanitarian politics, is divergent interests. None the less, a form of transnational governance is emerging.

From an IR perspective this development begs an answer to the question of power. How can we conceive of power in a context that is neither anarchic- nor under a single jurisdiction? What is power when actors are cannot induce threats- or buy each other off? (see Hovi 1998) What is the structure in which humanitarian organisations interact, if it is not comparable to the interstate anarchy, the market or a hierarchy? In order to explore this theme, I ask the question:

What actors have power and influence over the political processes aimed at producing humanitarian governance?

2.1 Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Organisations

Humanitarianism, in the literature on the subject, is most often defined as “the desire to relieve the suffering of a distant stranger” (Weiss 1999; Barnett 2005; Kennedy 2009). The distance to the sufferer, in the context of this thesis, is taken to mean that the aid is provided to beneficiaries in another country. Suffering is taken to mean something more immediate in nature than poverty or oppression. Humanitarian action is the response to an immediate emergency, conflict or catastrophe. As such it constitutes a field separate from development and poverty reduction. This is at least the platonic ideal form of humanitarianism. In reality the boundaries between these fields of action have become more blurred (c.f. Barnett 2009).

Today, humanitarianism has become a global enterprise. The last twenty years have seen an explosive growth in the sector, both in the number of operational agencies-

and in the available funding (Barnett and Weiss 2011: 26-32). While the numbers remain uncertain estimates, it is possible to provide some indication of the extent of this growth: a census of American humanitarian organisations involved in emergency relief shows that there were 62 in 1950, 267 in 1990, and a staggering figure of 436 in 2000. On the global level, recent estimates state that there are some 2500 humanitarian organisations in the world, whereof 260 can be characterised as major players. The number of humanitarian actors on the ground for any given emergency can be immense: during the bombing of Sarajevo in 1994 there were more than 200 international humanitarian agencies present on the ground. (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 31)

This large fauna of operative humanitarian agencies includes all manner of organisations. There are intergovernmental organisations, such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the WFP; religious organisations, like World Vision, Islamic Relief and Caritas Internationalis; non-governmental multinationals as Oxfam, Save the Children and Care; organisations with special status in international law, solely the ICRC. As shall be extensively discussed later, they differ along a series of attributes, yet share a commitment to relieving distant suffering. More recently they have also started to share a concern that lack of coordination between themselves is leading to sub-optimal outcomes (Barnett and Weiss 2011).

2.2 Humanitarian Governance

Humanitarian governance as a broad phenomenon has, to my knowledge, not been systematically investigated before within- at least not in an IR context. By humanitarian governance I mean any attempt at regulating the field as a whole. Attempts to regulate within a specific national context are not included. Humanitarian governance is in this thesis the transnational governance of the humanitarian field. Which also implies transorganisational governance; governance of more than one organisational entity. Specifically, it is manifested in governance mechanisms- by which I mean any instrument, organisation or agreement- seeking to regulate any aspect of the humanitarian field.

Several of the challenges facing the humanitarian sector can be described as problems of collective action¹, these challenges can present themselves in policies ranging from human resources to standards of relief delivery. The need for humanitarian governance occurs because individual solutions in these areas can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Humanitarian organisations, and the sector as a whole, could potentially benefit greatly from increased governance. However, this process becomes political as the organisations differ with regards to what form and content they desire with regards to which policy areas. The field is too heterogeneous to simplify in terms of one set of preferences and interests. I will also use the term governance initiative, as distinct from governance mechanisms. An initiative is an individual element of governance. So that the Sphere-project (see Sphere 2012) is the governing mechanism that produced the Sphere Handbook (see The Sphere Project 2011) as a governance initiative.

2.3 The inter-humanitarian anarchy

Humanitarian organisations are not sovereign. They work under the framework of the nation states- and are liable under the law and sovereign jurisdiction of the states in which they operate. However, their work is by definition conducted under special circumstances. Emergency relief becomes necessary as states are unable -or unwilling- to provide adequate relief for their population. This means that the work is conducted in an environment where the state is already hard pressed to effectively implement its sovereign will. While the state might wish to control and coordinate the activities of humanitarian organisations, its capacity to do so is often severely compromised. This is most evident in the case of war, when the ability to exert sovereignty dwindles alongside the monopoly on violence. However, it can also be the case in natural disasters. The sudden onset of a natural disaster leaves local authorities hard pressed- and they seldom have the additional capacity and bureaucratic resources available to control an influx of humanitarian agencies. While these might seem as theoretical musings, they manifest as a reoccurring reality (see eg. DeWaal 1997; Smilie 2001; Juma and Suhrke 2002).

So in the operational context, while not sovereign, humanitarian agencies are often

1 See Chapter 2. Theory and Earlier Research

ungovernable. Attacking the issue from a different angle, the organisations could potentially be controlled by the state of origin- that is the state in which they have their head office. However, the origin state has no sovereignty over the territories in which the organisations operate. While they can demand certain standards if they relate to the organisation as donors, they cannot effectively control the organisations operation. Humanitarian organisations are transnational, and therefore outside the effective sovereignty of any single state.

It is not unfair to summarise this situation as a form of anarchy. As Keohane and Axelrod (1985: 226) put it, anarchy simply implies the “lack of common government in World Politics”. This is as true for sovereign states, as it is for humanitarian organisations. None the less, there are some qualitative differences between the inter-humanitarian and the interstate anarchy. Much of IR is built on deriving causal necessities from the international anarchy. The anarchy as a structure has therefore been the subject of much debate, centring primarily around the importance of absolute and relative gains (see eg. Grieco 1988; Powell 1991; Snidal 1991). In the case of humanitarian organisations, this theoretical distinction becomes somewhat empty. As neither trade, nor war is a viable option, the structural implications of the anarchy are not transferable. Neither the Hobbesian state of nature (see Hobbes 1985), nor the liberal market anarchy (deMolinari 1977) are apt descriptions of the context in which humanitarian organisations seek to govern themselves. Deprived of the threat of violence and the spectre of commerce, the anarchy is perhaps best described by one of its' ideological proponents:

Anarchy is "the name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government- harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements [...] Voluntary associations would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and degrees, local, regional, national and international temporary or more or less permanent - for all possible purposes." (Kropotkin 1910)

Kropotkin's description of anarchy has similarities with the observed phenomena of

humanitarian governance. Yet Kropotkin clearly envisaged this as a state of affairs where dominance, if not power, would be absent. The challenge addressed in this thesis is how to conceive of power- within this structure of anarchy.

2.4 IR-Theoretical context

Academic IR has traditionally been defined as the study of politics between states. As Keohane and Nye (1971: 329) succinctly summarised it: "The state, regarded as an actor of purpose and power, is the primary unit of action; its' main agents are the diplomat and soldier." In this regard, this thesis deals with issues at the periphery of the IR academic discipline. States, if they do play a part, have a very limited influence over global humanitarian governance. This would seem to place the thesis within the domain of the growing field of TNA research. The red thread throughout TNA research is its' focus on TNAs impact on the politics between states. Influence, or TNA power, is implicitly defined as *the ability to alter the actions of states or intergovernmental organisations*. This presupposition excludes the possibility that TNAs can be of significance to world politics in their own right. Not surprisingly, realists tended to claim that TNA impact was limited to influence over non-essential foreign policy areas for a state. That is, their influence on world politics is via powerful states. Liberal institutionalist, on the other hand, have focused on TNAs ability to influence the policy of intergovernmental organisations. More recently, complex models of how -and under what conditions- TNAs matter, have been presented. There have been a series of attempts to specify the conditions for impact and variables determining degree of impact for non-state actors. (see Risse 2007: 267)

My argument is that not all political processes on a global level include states, humanitarian governance being a case in point. This claim is not to be taken to mean that humanitarian organisations cannot be influenced by states. Humanitarian organisations can be -and are- used to front state agendas (see e.g. Barnett 2001). While states can use humanitarian organisations for different purposes in different settings, the global governance of the sector has yet to include states in any meaningful capacity². These process might not be international in the semantic sense, but they are

2 It should be noted that ALNAP is an exception to this rule. The network is an active collaboration between

certainly transnational- and they do matter.

This claim does fit in with scholars fronting the Gramscian concept of a civil society as relevant for IR. For neo-Gramscians the civil society is:

“the political space and collective institutions in which and through which individuals form political identities . . . It is the realm of voluntary associations, of the norms and practices which make them possible, and of the collective identities they form, the realm where “I” becomes “we”.”(Murphy 1994 cited in Germain and Kenny 1998: 7)

While the concept of a global civil society is useful- it is not entirely clear that the Gramscian approach lends itself to the question of humanitarian governance. First, the level of analysis is that of organisations- not individual people. It is the broad fauna of humanitarian organisations which construct and -in some cases- adhere to the governance mechanisms. Secondly, it is far from clear that humanitarianism has evolved into a realm where “I” becomes “we”. Part of the reason for the limited success of humanitarian governance is the humanitarian “crise de cohérence” (Schloms 2006). There is no unified humanitarian “we” beyond the joint stakes in the activity of aiding distant strangers.

Another theoretical candidate for tackling these forms of processes is the analytical concept of global governance. Global governance is defined by Rossenau (1995: 13) as the analysis of all “systems of rule at all levels of human activity- from the family to the international organization- in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.” The meta-narrative of the governance literature is that the world has grown in complexity- producing an ever increasing demand for collaborative action. Problems of collective action are not particular to the relations between states, but have become ever more present in all aspects of organised human interaction. This increased demand for means of achieving collaborative action has produced a massive proliferation of steering mechanisms. The need for collaboration is, in other words, presented as a cause for the production of new and

NGOs, UN agencies, and state-donors. Power relations between the three types of members is a bit unclear within the network (see Stein 2009)

complex forms of governance. (See Rosenau 1995)

This approach is certainly broad enough to include humanitarian governance- but the ambitions and scope of the approach might have come at the expense of causal complexity. In analysing a specific instance of emerging governance, humanitarian governance in this case, Rossenau's approach seems to remove the political component from the process. Different actors will, usually, have different preferred outcomes- and different available power resources. The structure and content of the eventual governance mechanism will necessarily also be a consequence of the political struggle that occurred during the process that established it. I do not dispute the central claims made by Rossenau (1995) about the growing complexity of transnational governance, but if we are to understand these processes we need to include agency and power in the analysis.

How can the altered structural conditions in transnational governance be used to generate a concept of power? Finding no clear answers in the dominant approaches to the question, I turn a bit farther afield. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is an area of research specifically adapted to analyse complex relations. The theoretical side of the method is developed to explain how structural positions in a web of complex affiliations can generate advantages for individual actors. The empirical tradition provides clear operationalisations of the proposed concepts of structural power. (See Tichy, Tushman et al. 1979; Scott 1988; Hanneman and Riddle 2005) Kropotkin might have believed that voluntary associations in “an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations” would constitute a form of organisation in which uneven distribution of power would cease to be an issue. Social Network Analysis is the approach that would beg to differ.

2.5 Concluding note on relevance

Theories of an international civil society have proliferated within IR the last twenty years, most notably within the study of TNAs and global governance. This thesis seeks to expand upon these approaches by taking the next logical step towards inclusion of non-states actors in IR: regarding non-state actors as political agents by their own

right- independent of states. Analysing humanitarian governance is of special interest, because it is a case of similar non-state agents, attempting to overcome problems collective action, within anarchical framework qualitatively distinct from the interstate anarchy. The key challenge is is to redefine the concept of power, from state to non-state actors. Which is why the research question is designed to deal with that issue specifically. I seek to test the applicability of Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a means to do so. If the SNA approach proves fruitful in the case of humanitarian governance, it might be exportable to other areas of transnational governance as well.

Beyond the theoretical relevance I would also argue that the transnational governance of humanitarianism is of great import- in and of itself. Humanitarian Aid is a multi-billion dollar field. Western states still give more in humanitarian relief than they do in development aid- and while all figures remain uncertain estimates ,the sum of humanitarian aid channelled from governments is above 11 billion USD. Adding private funding to this figure would dramatically increase it- though it is hard to estimate by how much (See Randal 2011). These funds are channelled through humanitarian organisations. How many organisations is unclear, but the most dramatic estimates claim that there could be as many as 4000 humanitarian organisations operating from Western states (see Macrae and Harmer 2003:23-26). Humanitarians provide a vital life-line for people all over the globe- the mistakes and successes of these organisations can have a major impact on entire populations. The governance of these organisations should be an area of interest for IR scholars.

3 Theory and Earlier Research

3.1 A short history of humanitarian governance

Any narrative of the emergence of humanitarian governance must inevitably begin with the catastrophic humanitarian response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The series of mistakes made by the actors on the ground and -arguably- the failure of the entire sector, became a catalyst for a series of self-regulation initiatives. The accusations against the humanitarian community's actions in Rwanda were quite

severe: they prolonged the genocide by actively promoting ceasefire, they inadvertently provided logistical support to Interahamwe militia in exile, and they actively hampered the new Rwandan governments attempts at establishing effective sovereignty within their territories. (De Waal 1997: 192-197)

As shall be discussed below, these events provoked some harsh criticisms of the sector from the academic community. Beyond the discussions of scholars, for the humanitarian organisations themselves, the most significant interpretations of the failures were published in the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) -in the third study conducted by ODI (1996).

This study concluded that some "form of regulation or enforcement is needed to ensure improvements in performance by NGOs"(ODI 1996: 196). The study recommended establishing an international accreditation system, developed jointly by official agencies and NGOs. These were to be upheld by an unspecified entity to "administer accreditation, funding, reporting relationships, etc". As a second option they recommended self-managed regulation. They emphasised that this method would only be sufficient if donors reserved their funding for accredited organisations, and supported the NGO community in establishing methods of monitoring compliance with the common codes and standards. (ODI 1996: 197)

The findings of JEEAR had wide implications for the humanitarian community. After the report was published the regulatory initiatives presented came from the sector itself. HAP International was established as a direct response to JAEER and a parallel research project on humanitarian accountability (HAP 2012). ALNAP was established jointly by donors and humanitarian organisations as a direct consequence of the JAAER evaluation (ALNAP 2012). The SPHERE project, though not tied directly to JAEER, was still a result of post-Rwanda discussions between Oxfam and IFRC in Europe, and a post-Rwanda conference held by InterAction in the United States (Buchanan-Smith 2003).

While the NGO-community was active, the newly established Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)- later to become OCHA, was struggling to establish its'

role as coordinator of the sector. DHA had been established out of the desire to coordinate the efforts of UN and NGO humanitarian organisations by General Assembly resolution (UNGA 1992). However, their funding was limited and, as Weiss (1998) argues, the the qualifications of its' staff was even more so. This made it very difficult for them to exert any authority. In the years between 1992 and 1997, their primary objective was to gain authority over the other operative UN agencies- which they inevitably failed to accomplish.

Meanwhile, the first Sphere handbook was published in 2000 and rapidly became one of the most widespread sets of common standards in the sector (Hilhorst 2002: 201). Some critics claimed that despite enjoying vocal support from prominent humanitarians, the Sphere-standards were not broadly used in a field setting: Hugo Slim (cited in Borton 2009: 21) noted a “high talk up but low take-up of the SPHERE standards” None the less, it seemed evident that the Sphere-project had achieved what DHA had failed to accomplish: they had produced an instrument of governance that was endorsed by both UN agencies and the NGO-community alike (Sphere 2012). Created by NGOs, the Sphere standards were now being used by heavy UN-agencies (c.f. WFP and UNHCR 2008).

In a parallel development DHA, now named OCHA, produced the so called cluster-approach, in which lead agencies are given mandate to coordinate -and held directly accountable for- an entire section of the humanitarian response (logistics, shelter, food distribution etc.). This approach was first tested in response to the Pakistani earthquakes of 2005. Subsequent evaluations concluded that the approach had presented some moderate success in predictability, but also noted that the institutionalisation of the approach left much to be desired (Stoddard, Harmer et al. 2007: 45).

Approximately ten years after Rwanda, another major evaluation was produced in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami (see Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006). This was the biggest joint evaluation since JEEAR. For the humanitarian community the evaluation had the potential to answer the major question: had the work towards

governance of the sector born tangible fruit? The conclusions were cautiously optimistic, but the evaluation still described several of the same issues that had been revealed by JEEAR. As Hofmann (2011) succinctly summarised it:

[T]he sector has developed a series of codes and standards to regulate itself. While these have gone some way to improve the quality and accountability of humanitarian assistance, there are limits to what can be achieved through self-regulation. As far back as 1996, [JEEAR] clearly stated that the development of codes and standards is not enough. [...] Ten years later, the joint evaluation of the tsunami response made a similar recommendation.

Today, fifteen years after Rwanda, humanitarian governance has continued to evolve into an ever more complex network of umbrella organisations, common standards, accountability practices, codes of conduct, and joint statements on principles. From human resource policies towards their staff (People in Aid 2008), to broad platforms defining humanitarianism (Global Humanitarian Platform 2007), these diverse organisational phenomena seek to establish global rules for the humanitarian sector. What they all have in common is that membership is voluntary, and formal enforcement-mechanisms are weak- or non-existent.

3.2 Earlier research on Humanitarian organisations

The systematic research on humanitarianism has its' origin from the period after Rwanda 1994. Consequentially, early works on humanitarian organisations were heavily influenced by disillusionment with the universal goodness of humanitarian values. Humanitarianism had captured the public imagination as an “activity that is wholly admirable, that one need not view sceptically” (Reiff 1997:132) Against this backdrop- and confronted with the failures in Rwanda- the critical focus of the early research becomes understandable. DeWaals (1997) book *Famine Crimes*, sparked the debate by pointing out how the self-interested actions of humanitarian organisations could harm those they were supposed to aid. Variations of this theme became dominant within the field. Reiff (1997: 133) endorsed the claim that humanitarianism

is a business where the organisations were not always capable of seeing the beneficiaries as their customers. Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 725) characterised the professionalisation of humanitarianism as a bureaucratisation that led to pathological failures in the emerging sectors ability to achieve optimal outcomes. Smillie and Minear (2004: 183) published a work based on a rationalist model for humanitarian agency. According to them humanitarian organisations engage in a “dog-eat-dog competition, that is as relentless as it is unconstructive [*sic*].” They blamed sub-optimal outcomes on an imperfect market, corrupted by skewed incentives and mixed interests. In reviewing the literature on humanitarianism, Kennedy (2011: 2) concluded that “those reading contemporary research on humanitarianism would be forgiven for believing that humanitarianism is in a sorry state indeed.”

It is not difficult to spot the red-tread throughout this research. The dominant perspective is that of rational choice with regards to funding. I will argue below that the complex pattern of typologies and cleavages weakens the case for a simplified rational choice model- at least limited to funding. However, the rational choice focus of the earlier research does prompt a quick discussion of humanitarian governance as collective action.

3.3 Humanitarian Governance and Collective Action

Several of the core issues confronting the humanitarian community- the humanitarian dilemmas (see Barnett and Weiss 2011), can be described as problems of collective actions. For the sake of this discussion, let collective action problems exists when individual rational behaviour can plausibly lead to a strictly pareto-inferior outcome. (Cook and Levi 1990: 223) So the corollary becomes that some form of governing mechanism would be advantageous to all actors. To begin with an unlikely case, consider human resource policies as an example. Professionalisation of the sector requires personnel that stay on for longer periods of time. For this to be achievable salaries must be competitive and proportionate to the education and experience of the staff. (see Barnett and Weiss 2011: 115-7) Let us assume that all organisations desire professionalisation- but that high salary costs make them less attractive to donors. By instigating a governance mechanism that regulates human resource policies in the

sector- they can then achieve higher professionalism while maintaining a levelled playing field. Likewise, the question of humanitarian-military collaboration can be seen as a collective action problem. The distinction between humanitarian organisations and military actors is a common good- if one organisation associates with the military then all others will bear the cost. Humanitarians in general will be associated with actors in the conflict- thereby reducing the security of the sector as a whole. (see Barnett and Weiss 2011: 110-2) In this situation standard rational choice theory would predict a race to the bottom, where all humanitarian organisations seek to maximise their own security by collaborating with armed actors. This logic can be applied to any number of issues confronting the humanitarian field.

However, the simple elegance of this rational choice approach to humanitarian governance is achieved at a cost. It assumes that the interests of the actors are identical. This is not the case. Humanitarian actors are split along several cleavages- and humanitarian governance becomes more than simply achieving optimal-outcomes. It becomes a political contest.

3.4 Divergent interests: Humanitarian heterogeneity

A colloquial definition of politics is that it is the process by which groups representing divergent interests and values make collective decisions. In the previous section it was shown that collective decisions might be of advantage to the humanitarian sector. The discussion was conducted under the assumption that the humanitarian sector was homogeneous in terms of preferences and interests. In this section it will be shown that the process to establish joint decisions is political; precisely because the assumption of humanitarian homogeneity is faulty.

3.4.1 Typologies and cleavages

The fauna of international organisations that fall under Barnett's definition of humanitarianism is varied. There are large IGOs, like the World Food Program, the mandated: "food aid arm of the United Nations system"(WFP 2012). This is an organisation operative in more over 70 different states, employing in excess of 12 000

staff on long-term contracts, with a financial turnover of 4.2 billion dollars. (WFP 2010) On the more modest side of the spectrum you find organisations as the Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights. This organisation builds houses, provides medical care, and helps people find employment possibilities; in America- and abroad. The fiscal turnover is in excess of 70 million USD, but only about 4% of this is used outside of the US-border. (Heartland Alliance 2010) There are networks of national organisations that vary, from the strict federational form of IFRC, to the ACF's loose concept of shared values. There are organisation, like the ICRC, who pride themselves on absolute independence, and organisations like the UNHCR- which occasionally acts as the administrative arm of states' immigration politics. (Barnett and Weiss 2008, Barnett 2001)

Humanitarian variance has proved difficult to summarise in a single analytical framework. After conducting a survey of the typologies Macrae and Harmer (2003: 28) where forced to conclude that:

There may in fact be no satisfactory way of categorising [humanitarian] NGOs according to their philosophy, and there are potentially unlimited ways of carving up the community according to which of the humanitarian principles and values are emphasised, and in what operational context.

The following summary of attempts to categorise humanitarian organisations are therefore not meant to be a complete list. However, for this thesis they will suffice as a demonstration of humanitarian heterogeneity.

3.4.2 Intergovernmental and non-governmental

This distinction has not been broadly elaborated in the literature, which seems to focus on the non-governmental side of humanitarianism (see Macrae and Harmer 2003; Schloms 2005; Weiss 1999). However, Barnett's definition of humanitarianism clearly incorporates IGOs- as he has repeatedly made clear (Barnett 2001; Barnett 2005; Barnett and Weiss 2008) . The distinction between the two are important. While NGOs are -at least in principle- free to change their mandate and practices, IGOs have

mandates given to them by states. Many IGO's are UN organisations or specialised agencies. They report on their ability to fulfil their mandate, either to the intergovernmental institution that established them, or to the UN General Assembly's Economic and Social Council. (UN Charter 1945: art. 55-63). So while NGOs are in principle free to choose their relationship with states, IGOs are irrevocably tied to states and their interests.

3.4.3 Religious, Dunantists and Wilsonians

This distinction is based on the idea that modern humanitarianism has evolved from three different origins. These differences in origin have led to three distinct humanitarian traditions: Religious, Dunantist and Wilsonian. Macrae and Harmer (2003: 27-28) also indicate that this division can have a geographical dimension. US organisations have a tendency to associate with Wilsonian ideals, while Europe has a stronger Dunantist affinity. The faith-based organisations tend towards a division between the Islamic east, and Christian west- in addition to a protestant US and Northern Europe and a Catholic south of Europe.

Missionary organisations, tied to European colonialism, were among the first manifestations of organised humanitarianism. These organisations had the ambition of relieving, not only the physical, but also the spiritual suffering of distant strangers. Today the spirit of evangelism is a bit dampened. Catholic organisation like the CRS, Caritas and CAFOD, all have a religious mandate to preach the kingdom come, but manage to deliver services unconditionally- and without religious bias. World Vision, another large organisation, closely tied to a protestant Christianity, has been operational in Afghanistan with a predominantly Muslim staff. The programs they delivered were "indistinguishable from those of secular counter-parts." (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 27). While the program activities might have become secularised, the organisations still have a clearly religious identities, and still rely on funding from churches and faith organisations.

In addition to the Christian-faith organisations there has also been a recent growth in Islamic humanitarianism. Though based in a different faith, these organisations should

also be included religious humanitarianism. While the Christian organisations seem to have progressed towards secular programs (Macrae and Harmer 2003, Ferris 2005), these organisations have been accused of being unable to distinguish between the religious and humanitarian agenda (see Ferris 2005: 322-323). These accusations have not been documented, but originate from interviews of Christian humanitarian actors. It cannot be concluded that Islamic organisations are less secular than their Christian counterparts; but it is interesting to note the tendencies towards conflict between these two groups.

The second tradition is the one perhaps most often identified with modern humanitarianism; the Dunantist tradition. This tradition derives its' name from Henri Dunant who established the ICRC as a response the horrific violation of civilians he witnessed in the battle of Solferino in 1859. The tradition focuses on protection of civilians and the proliferation of international humanitarian law. A major ideal is independence from states, religions and other potential sources of conflict. Philosophically it is based on the idea of a universal humanitarian imperative- to aid and protect those who suffer. While the ICRC cannot technically be described as an NGO, several of the worlds largest humanitarian NGOs belong to this tradition: Save the Children was established to aid orphans of the first world war, Oxfam to provide food aid to occupied Greece during the second world war, and MSF, while established in opposition to the ICRC's handling of the Biafra emergency in 1970, still falls under the broad umbrella of the Dunantist tradition. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 27-28)

The third tradition is the Wilsonian tradition- deriving its' name from American president Woodrow Wilson. After world war two, the Marshal Plan was instigated -not only to alleviate the suffering of the Europeans- but also to build a transatlantic partnership between the US and the European powers. This was the first manifestation of a modern a Wilsonian humanitarianism. This tradition does not see a clear cut distinction between humanitarianism and state-interests. Staff typically move freely- and frequently- between government offices and NGOs. They typically have little or no qualms about relying on state funding, and do not really concern themselves with how their work might serve state interests. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 27) In broader

IR-theory, Wilsonian humanitarianism even has a neo-realist justification from the state's perspective. Nye(2008: 94) emphasise the concept of soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment." Wilsonian humanitarianism is assumed to build attraction and therefore increases the states ability to obtain desired outcomes.

3.4.4 Classicist and Solidarists

In 1971 MSF was established in protest to the ICRC's handling of the Biafra crisis. French doctors, returning from the field, were outraged at the ICRC's perceived complacency in the face of the atrocities committed by the Nigerian army. The MSF has later evolved into an organisation that is markedly different from its' Red Cross origins. Reiss (1999 cited in Macrae and Harmer 2003) proposes a spectrum, from Classicist to Solidarist, to capture this difference in humanitarian approaches. Organisations affiliated with the Red Cross movement are usually found on the Classicist side of the spectrum. These organisations eschew public confrontation, avoid taking sides, deliver aid according to principles of non-discrimination, and rely completely on the consent of all conflicting parties. MSF is found on the opposite side of the spectrum, which Reiss calls Solidarist. These organisations advocate controversial policy, take the sides of the victims, skews the balance of resource allocation, and overrides sovereignty when necessary. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 28-29)

The key distinction is that between independence and neutrality. Solidarist organisations are avidly independent, as are classicist, but they differ on the weight they attach to neutrality. This distinction is more than simply a difference in practice, the divide between solidarists and classicists is fundamentally ideological. The best known formulation of the classicist ideal is to be found in the ICRC's mission statement: "ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance." (ICRC 2012) A rather poetic formulation of the solidarist ideology was provided in Orbinski's Nobel Peace

Prize acceptance speech on behalf of MSF:

Humanitarian action is more than simple generosity, simple charity. It aims to build spaces of normalcy in the midst of what is profoundly abnormal. More than offering material assistance, we aim to enable individuals to regain their rights [. . .] Our action and our voice is an act of indignation, a refusal to accept an active or passive assault on the other. (Orbinski 1999)

The classicist-solidarist spectrum is not only applicable to MSF and ICRC. NGOs based in Nordic countries are known for being unapologetically Solidarist, the faith-based organisations included. British based organisations, such as OXFAM, are also known to have Solidarist tendencies, while perhaps not to the extreme of their French counterparts. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 27-28)

3.4.5 Funding and donors

Another way to categorise humanitarian organisations is by their sources of funding; the typical distinction is made between private and public. Private funding, from individuals, corporations, or religious societies, are usually less conditional- and therefore leave organisation more independent. Public funding, that is funding from states, can be given on conditions of specific usage, or for specific programs and projects. However, the distinction is not categorical, as most large humanitarian organisations rely on a combination of private and public funding. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 28-9).

There is also a large diversity in how states act as donors. ECHO, for instance, has a rigorous reporting and accountability policies -even taking the step of conducting their own field monitoring of the humanitarian activities they finance. For gulf-state donors, the Islamic concept of *zakat*, or charity, hinders active accountability practices because the size and content of donations are to be kept private in accordance with the Qur'an. A common distinction is that between states that are members of OECD and the new donors, including China, the gulf states, and the rising Asian economies. However,

lack of data and research means that there are few theories as to how these different donors shape the actions of the humanitarian organisations that they finance.

(Harmer and Cotterell 2009)

3.4.6 Affective, introvert and extrovert organisations

Another interesting typology is provided by Schloms (2006). His method is descriptive ethics and his focus is on the field-staff of humanitarian organisations. He analyses the choices and legitimisation of organisations faced with a humanitarian dilemma: weighing the short-term provision of relief against long-term considerations of justice. In mapping out the responses he found a pattern between organisational form and the source used for justifying the choice. His differentiation between introvert, extrovert and affective organisations is based on the sources the staff use to legitimise their response to the moral dilemma.

The introvert approach is to look toward the organisations internal standards for guidance. Central tenants for the field workers moral doctrine are the organisations mandate and principles. For a more detailed instruction, standard procedures and working principles are seen as a manifestations of these. Schloms mentions UN-organisations and the ICRC as prime examples of the the introvert response. Whether field workers revere the UN-charter or the Geneva Conventions, these doctrines are seen as a high ideal, which legitimise the moral detailed guidelines. These organisations tend have large mandates, objective criteria for needs assessments, and espouse to a doctrine of humanitarian neutrality. Politics are seen as the environment within which humanitarians operate.

The extrovert approach draws its moral reasoning from the situation in which the humanitarians operate. Right or wrong is determined by whether one stands on the side of the victims or the aggressors. In response to the specific dilemma posed by Schloms, these organisations view withdrawal of humanitarian aid as the last resort in the political tool-chest. They are none the less willing to use that tool when necessary.

MSF and MDM are naturally mentioned as prime examples of extrovert organisations. According to Schloms these organisations tend to have narrow mandates, they prioritise beneficiaries by political and social criteria, and maintain an unapologetically political profile. They typically view states as the adversaries of the humanitarians.

The Affective approach is an emotional reaction rather than a deliberate strategy. The act of providing assistance is seen as an act of pity and charity- rather than a response to the beneficiary's right to assistance. From this perspective there is really no dilemma between politics and humanitarianism, there are only needs and deeds. Organisations with this approach tend to have broad mandates and a broad variance in their programs. They consider themselves apolitical but have no strict distinction between the political and humanitarian arenas.

(Schloms 2006)

3.5 Governance, divergent interest and the relevance of power

The variance within the humanitarian sector has been characterised as a "crisis of coherence" (Schloms 2006) and "an anxious collective identity crisis" (Barnett 2011: 3). In trying to outline the sources of interests in the humanitarian sector Similie and Minear (2004: 9) described it as "a mishmash of politics, economics, commercial calculation, guilt, and solidarity." A consequence this mosaic of ideologies, approaches, organisational forms, and funding sources, is that the organisations have diverging interests as to what form and content they desire for humanitarian governance. Any agency model with an ambition to explain humanitarian governance must therefore take these diverging interests into account.

3.6 Humanitarian Agency

The most systematic summary of humanitarian agency models can be found in Kennedy (2011: 21-25). He proposes four models of humanitarian agency with regards to governance: the instrumentally rational model, the value rational model, the social structural model and the integrative model. He does not explicitly discuss the model of

rational self-interest with regards to funding, but found it -as I did- appropriate to discard this approach from the outset (Kennedy 2011: 2).

The instrumental rationality model sees humanitarian actors as responding to a practical challenge in effecting their work. In discussing need for humanitarian governance above I implicitly assumed an instrumentally rational model of humanitarian agency. From this point of view the sector is being governed in direct response to the need for governance. The humanitarian actors are simply attempting to achieve optimal outcomes by collective action. The weakness of this approach is that it depoliticises humanitarian governance and, as shown in the discussion of divergent interests, this is not a viable option. There might well be an instrumental need for humanitarian governance, but the actors are not in agreement as to what this entails.

The value rational model sees humanitarian organisations as primarily ethical agents. They act in accordance with ethical systems, or systems of values (Kennedy 2011: 22). This is a better fit with regards to the divergent interests. Several of the key cleavages are based on competing sets of values for what humanitarianism should be; they are conflict over what constitutes the true humanitarianism. However, this models weakness is that it fails to provide the element of a strategic agency. It is well and good to consider humanitarian organisations ethical agents, but more difficult to follow this line of reasoning to its conclusion in terms of the chosen actions. It is also difficult to see how it can be of help in defining power. How does a humanitarian organisation impose their sets of values on other actors- and why should they wish to? Should power be measured in rhetorical skill – or abilities in formal ethical reasoning?

The structural model of humanitarian organisations, views organisations as responding to a shifting external environment. The core argument is that the context in which humanitarians are operating is in constant flux, rendering the humanitarians of-balance in terms of how they react. Actions of humanitarian organisations is understood as reactions to external change (Kennedy 2011). This model corresponds with Barnett's (2009) evolutionary perspective on humanitarian organisations: humanitarian organisations must adapt constantly to changes in the environment, or


face extinction. This model too has clear merits, but it does not provide much help with regards to the question of power. The governance is contested among the humanitarian organisations- and it is from this conflict that different governing mechanisms and initiatives arise. While change in the context challenges existing models- this observation does not provide an adequate answer to how one humanitarian organisation can influence another.

The fourth model, the integrative approach to humanitarian agency, is a bit more complex than the others. It builds on the idea of the organisational field- defined as an area of activity upon which the interests of the actors converge. The humanitarian field is defined by humanitarianism as an activity in which all the organisations have a stake. (Kennedy 2011: 25) The concept of fields was first proposed by Bourdieu (eg. 1984), and has later been adapted to fit organisational practices by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Kennedy argues that the concept of the field better captures the humanitarianism than the competing concepts of regimes, epistemic community and network. With regards to networks, Kennedy (2011: 26) notes that "it is true that in many ways humanitarianism functions through network form", but continues to argue that the network concept focus too much on formal patterns of interaction and "lacks an argument about structure- about the network playing a role other than organising exchange." I disagree with this view on networks, and in the necessity of dichotomising field and network as analytical approaches. So while I have built on Kennedy (2011: 24-33), the following description of the integrative model of humanitarian agency has been adapted to accommodate my inclusion of the network concept.

The integrative model assumes that what humanitarian organisations desire is legitimacy. In Bourdieu's terms, legitimacy is the symbolic capital of the humanitarian field. The capital against which all other forms of capital are measured. When asking if a humanitarian organisation is successful, it is a question of how legitimate they are. So how does a humanitarian organisation achieve legitimacy?

Humanitarian organisations can use different capitals to build legitimacy. Capital -in

this sense- is anything that can promote legitimacy. This is a very broad definition of capital- but the types of capital that can produce legitimacy are too many and varied for precision. The ICRCs special mandate and protection under the Geneva Convention (1946: art. 3, 9, 11, 12) can provide legitimacy as external recognition. The MSF's Nobel Prize from 1999 can do the same for them. A large organisation, with operations in many different emergencies, can gain legitimacy from their size. UNHCR can be perceived as especially legitimate with regards to refugees- not only because of their special position granted in the Refugee Convention (1951)- but also because they have niche competence with regards to forced migration situations. An organisation- such as MSF- can gain legitimacy from their independence from state funding, whereas others can gain recognition for their cooperation with state donors. The forms of capital in the diagram below are not intended as an exhaustive list, but merely a few examples of what can constitute capital in the field of humanitarianism.



There are many forms of capital in the humanitarian field. The key element in the integrative model is not a limited list of capital forms, but rather the observation that the value of the capital can be manipulated by strategic agency. Forms of capital can be fungible, allowing for creative trade-offs between organisations. Another key observation of this model is that it illustrates precisely why humanitarian governance

is political. Codification of humanitarian principles and precise definitions of correct humanitarian practice- will inevitably increase the value of the available capital for some- and decrease it for others.

Consider the question of accountability. The down-ward accountability to the beneficiaries, as proposed by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (see HAP 2012), might appeal to certain Dunantist organisations, while for the Wilsonians, with their close connection to states as donors, this codification of accountability will either decrease their funding- or the legitimacy of their operative work. The minimum standards proposed by Sphere (see The Sphere Project 2011), will make it difficult for Solidarist organisations to be selective about who they prioritise for aid delivery. Their freedom to treat a humanitarian disaster as a political problem, as well as their freedom to pick sides, is a vital capital form for them. Loosing this freedom reduces their legitimacy.

So the question of humanitarian governance is a question of defining legitimacy. The different organisations all possess different forms of capital- but how much this capital is worth is dependent on what gets defined as legitimate. The purpose of using power is therefore to shape the development of humanitarian governance so as to maximise the value of the organisations capital- and thereby increase the organisations legitimacy

3.7 Theoretical definition of power

So how does the integrated model provide a definition of power with regards to governance of the humanitarian field? How is it conceivable that a humanitarian organisation can alter the actions of another- possibly against its' strategic interest? There are no conventional coercive courses of action available, but that is not to say there is no influence.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) presented the idea of isomorphic process to explain how organisations in a field converge towards the same logics of practice over time. An isomorphic process is a constraining process that causes one unit in a population to

resemble others that are facing the same environmental conditions. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150) outline three ways in which such a process can take shape: “1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; 2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and 3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization.”

Of these, mimetic isomorphism is the most relevant to the humanitarian field. Mimetic isomorphism is caused by uncertainty rather than coercion. DiMaggio and Powell (1983:151) argue that “when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organization.” As has been demonstrated in the earlier discussion, ambiguous goals and an environment of uncertainty are fitting descriptions of the operational context of humanitarian organisations. Mimetic isomorphism is a means by which organisations can overcome this uncertainty. By modelling their organisations on others, which they see as successful, they can find solutions to their predicament in a cost-efficient manner. The mimetic response to uncertainty can be seen as a rational choice, as the alternative cost of reinventing the wheel is probably higher than the cost of mimicry. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:151)

An example of mimetic responses, causing an isomorphic process, is the spread of corporate structures among multinational humanitarian organisations. While World Vision and Care International, always had a clear corporate structure organising their national branches, OXFAM International and MSF International would function more as loose networks. However, in recent years OXFAM and MSF have implemented policies that gradually make them resemble the corporate structures of World Vision and Care. (Stoddard 2003: 26) Simeant (2005) conducted a study of French multinational humanitarian NGOs, that demonstrated a growing difference in practice and policy between different national affiliations of the same organisation. Faced with the uncertainty and growing doubt with regards to collective identity, it is plausible that MSF and OXFAM looked to organisations that successfully maintained common practices for inspiration.

Humanitarian organisations will- as other organisations- be guided in how they operate by the practices they see as successful by other organisations. To tie this discussion in with the chosen model of humanitarian agency, they will converge against the practices of the most legitimate organisations. Yet who they see as most legitimate will depend on who they are. While operational capacity is a constant form of capital for all humanitarian organisations- the capital forms tied to identity or success within key niches are not.

While both MSF and ICRC are regarded as highly legitimate actors, they are non-compatible forms of legitimacy; one is based on neutrality the other on the freedom to act politically. So while both organisations might have the capacity to be the objects upon which other organisations mould their isomorphic adaptations- this will most likely be the case for different organisations. On questions regarding the relationship between politics and humanitarianism, Solidarists are more likely to follow MSF, while Classicist are more likely to follow ICRC. Isomorphism occurs along the route of least resistance.

As a consequence of this, social capital becomes the most important power-resource in humanitarian governance. The actors wish to achieve the broadest possible governance mechanisms that increases the value of their particular capitals- so as to increase their legitimacy. The broader a governance mechanism, the greater its' effect on what is defined as legitimate. When they are negotiating the form and content of these governance mechanisms- it is a bargaining process where each organisation seeks to maximise their gain. What can they use as a power-resource in this situation?

If an organisation is likely to be followed by many others, it is more likely to force through its' agenda. The threat of exit, perhaps the only threat available in humanitarian negotiations, becomes a lot more effective if this also entails the loss of support from several other actors. However, the process becomes more convoluted as the humanitarian field is fractured on so many dimensions. Some cleavages are crossing, such as Dunantist-Wilsonian and Classicist-Solidarist, while others are parallel such as Affective-Introvert and Dunantist Wilsonian. It is not just how many

organisations that recognise an actors legitimacy, there is also a structural element in how the position of the actor is advantageous in promoting any singular governance mechanism. An actor well placed to gather the support of both Dunantists and Wilsonians will have more significance in the process- and therefore also be better equipped to promote its' own interests. The Bourdieuan concept of social capital needs to be expanded to become a composite measure of relational power. For this I turn to Social Network Analysis.

There are at least three ways in which relational power can manifest. The first is participation. In order to have any chance of impacting the outcome- an organisation must first of all be present during the discussion. Assuming participation, the next is their value in promoting the initiative produced in the discussion. The greater an organisations importance in promoting an initiative- the more likely it is to successfully alter compromises in their favour. The importance of the organisations has to sides, the first its' ability to reach other actors. The more actors an organisations can reach and influence- the more valuable the organisation is for the initiative. However, if several other organisations present in the discussion can reach the same organisations- then this power is somewhat diminished. Therefore brokerage becomes the second source of power. An organisation well placed between two groups of organisations that are otherwise poorly connected- will have an negotiation advantage, as it can influence actors the governing initiative would otherwise not reach.

3.8 Hypotheses

The theoretical definition of power can be operationalised- as shall be extensively discussed below. However, the validity of the theory cannot simply be confirmed by measuring an indicator. If my concept of relational power is to be considered valid- it is dependent on the applicability of the agency model and the observed importance of relational power in the humanitarian governance network. The structures of interaction must also lend themselves to my notion of the transnational humanitarian anarchy. That is it must consist of “voluntary associations [in] an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations” and perhaps more to the

point, obedience cannot be subjugated to any single authority (Kropotkin 1910). The scientific language of testable hypothesis will be used to test for these assumptions, however, these are not hypothesis in the strict sense that they allow for falsification with a known probability of error. They do allow for falsification, in the sense that my assumption can be disproved, but the research design has no direct means of securing against a Robinson-Crusoe-Fallacy (see Tsebelis 1989). While a deductive logic is used to present hypothesis that can be tested against observation, it cannot be denied that the observations might be a consequence of a different phenomena. Stating my assumptions as hypothesis is therefore done primarily for the sake of clarity- not out of an ambition to provide undeniable proof.

3.8.1 Structural Hypotheses

If the integrative model is to fit the data, certain structural observations should be expected. The first is hierarchy in the network, the second is anarchy in the central network, the third is a relative high number of unique member constellations.

If organisations are to relate to an isomorphic leader, it would be expected that these leaders present themselves as tops of a hierarchy. There should, in other words, be evidence of hierarchical organisation in the humanitarian governance network, leading to the following hypothesis:

H1: The humanitarian governance network will have hierarchical tendencies

Somewhat paradoxically, the second assumption in the theory is that there will be no hierarchy. If the idea of the transnational humanitarian anarchy is to be valid- obedience cannot be subjugated to any single authority . This is resolved by assuming that as one approaches the centre of power in the network- the degree of hierarchy diminishes. Leading to the second hypothesis:

H2: The hierarchical tendencies of the humanitarian governance network will decline as one trims the network boundaries towards the core network.

I have argued that there are several cleavages dividing the humanitarian community-

which in turn allows for several possible positions in the network. If this is to be true, there must be a sufficiently high number of unique membership combinations in the network. If the constellations of interests in the humanitarian field is spread, then the concept of relational power becomes applicable. However, if there are only a few unique constellations- it is more likely that other power-resources (or Bourdieuan capitals) play a larger role. So what can constitute a sufficiently high number of unique constellations? This number inevitably becomes a bit arbitrary. However, assuming that my discussion of typologies and cleavages constitutes a minimum estimate of cleavages in the humanitarian field. Further, assuming that all actors can position on any combination of positions on these cleavages. Then an estimate of the absolute minimum expected unique combinations can be produced. There are five cleavages described, assuming two possible positions with regards to each, there are 2^5 possible unique positions. This is an absolute minimum: so the result will become dubious as it approaches 32. Leading to the hypothesis:

H3: There will be at least 32 unique constellations of membership in the humanitarian governance network.

3.8.2 Agency Hypotheses

For the concept of relational power to bear relevance to the humanitarian field, it is necessary that the integrative model of humanitarian agency is a good fit. The only way to evaluate the fit of an agency model is to observe behaviour. The qualitative part of this analysis investigates the behaviour of four organisations in the network, chosen by most-different criteria (see Gerring 2007) . These cases can be seen as representative of highly differed organisations- so if their behaviour confirms the expectations of the agency model, this strengthens the case for the models applicability. The model assumes that the pursuit of legitimacy is the primal motivation for humanitarian organisations- its' main competitor assumes that funding is primal. Therefore the first qualitative hypothesis is that:

³ 2^5 = all possible combinations of two values along 5 categories = 32

H4: Humanitarian organisations will value legitimacy over funding concerns when they interact with the humanitarian governance network.

Secondly, the agency model assumes that humanitarian organisations will wish to use the governing mechanisms to promote the value of their specific forms of legitimacy. This should manifest in observable strategic attempts at influencing the governance mechanism. The next hypothesis is that:

H5: The modus operandi of the humanitarian organisations will influence their desired outcomes from the governing mechanisms.

I have deduced the primacy of relational power over other forms of influence. If this is to be a valid conjecture it should manifest as the strategic use of relational power to achieve desired outcomes.

H6: The humanitarian organisations will attempt strategic use of their relational power resources to exert influence over the humanitarian governing mechanisms.

If relational power is as important as I have proposed- then the success or failure of such strategic moves should also be explainable in terms of the relational power resources available. Leading to the final hypothesis:

H7: The success or failure of attempts to strategically manipulate the humanitarian governance network should be explainable as consequence of available relational power resources.

4 3. Method: Social Network Analysis (SNA)

4.1 Introducing SNA

While some see SNA as a logical continuation of network theories within sociology (see Scott 1988), SNA in its modern form is very much a child of graph theory. It is based on mathematical concepts for visually representing relations between actors (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). While initially a graphical curiosity, the social sciences and humanities soon discovered the advantages of formal mathematical data to

represent relations. In history, the most celebrated example of SNA in practice is Padget and Ansell's (1993) analysis of the Medici's rise to power in Florence. Through a detailed analysis of the Medici families affiliations through marriages and politics- they show that the expansion of Medici's network into the elites was instrumental in their rise to power. Another use for SNA, in anthropology, is to identify specific structures of relations as archetypal patterns. Recording data in mathematical form has allowed for a more cohesive study of kinship relations across cultures. (Hanneman and Riddle 2005) The approach has spread to a broad variety of disciplines and substantive research areas, from administration (Cross and Andrew 2004), terrorism (Sageman 2004), finance and trade flows (Smith and White 1992) and the study of technology development clusters (Powell, Koput et al. 1996). More recently, SNA has made itself relevant in political science (see Kahler 2009)

So what are the core components of social network analysis? The first thing to note is that the data is relational. That is, it registers ties between actors by the dichotomy present or absent. Actors in SNA are usually referred to as nodes; a heritage from the its' graph theoretical origins. The lines denoting a relation, are referred to as edges. In essence, all social network analysis is based on data registered as nodes and edges. This data can be registered in a familiar form for political science: the simple data matrix. However, unlike the case by variable format where i = cases and j = variables- so that a_{ij} becomes the value of a variable for a specific case, social network matrices are symmetrical. In SNA matrices i is equal to j . Cases become nodes, registered symmetrically on i and j and the intersection a_{ij} in the matrix denotes edges as present (1) or absent (0). The direction of the affiliation can be denoted by keeping the data asymmetric with regards to the diagonal⁴.

So, $\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \sum_{j=1}^{j=i} a_{ij} = \sum relations i \rightarrow j$ and likewise $\sum_{j=1}^{j=m} \sum_{i=1}^{i=j} a_{ij} = \sum relations j \rightarrow i$

To illustrate with the form of an archetypal matrix:

4 The diagonal would denote a relationship to oneself- and therefore has no meaning. To avoid confusion in calculations the diagonal is usually coded zero. If the diagonal is coded (1) the equations must excluded the diagonal by specifying the $j=i-1$ and $i=j-1$

	j=1	j=2	j=3	j=4	[...]	j=n
i=1	0	1	1	1	0	0
i=2	1	0	1	0	1	0
i=3	1	1	0	0	1	1
i=4	0	1	1	0	1	1
[...]	0	1	0	1	0	0
i=n	1	1	0	1	0	0

With an understanding of the data format, most SNA measures become quite intuitive. Network Density, as an example, denotes the proportion of all possible edges present by:

$$\text{Network Density} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \sum_{j=1}^{j=n}}{n^2 - n}, \text{ as } i \text{ and } j \text{ are symmetric, } m = n$$

(Scott 1988; de Nooy, Mrvar et al. 2005; Hanneman and Riddle 2005) The other measures- intended for measurement of power in networks- will be discussed later.

The formal methods of SNA are mathematical; yet they are not statistical (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Consider the common distinction in political science between large-n and small-n studies (see Gerring 2007: 17-62). Where should one place network analysis? If one considers each node a case- it is natural to view it as a large-n approach. However, the observations are not independent of each other, nor can they be viewed as a representative sample of a larger population. As shall be discussed later, several mathematical measure can be produced as descriptives of different positions in the network. When the structural position of a single node is investigated- that node is referred to as the ego-node. SNA measures of the structural position of an ego-node is not dependent on qualities of that node- but rather its' relation with other nodes. Measures can be produced for every node in the network, but these are not variables in a statistical sense. They are more accurately described as measures of the network structure using different nodes as egos. SNA is therefore an analysis of a network as a single case: the item being analysed is the relations between nodes within

a single structure.

4.2 Structure, Agency and Causality in SNA

The above has been a description of the empirical aspect of SNA, but SNA is more than an empirical approach. It is also a distinct theoretical discipline. Akin to rational choice theory, it is a set of axioms on which formal theoretical concepts can be developed. Unlike rational choice, these axioms are not always expressed- and therefore seem more as presuppositions. The underlying assumptions in SNA theory can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Actors (as nodes) are aspects of a structure rather than agents with an independent capacity of choice.
- 2) To the extent that actors (as nodes) have interests- theses are presumed to be equal prior to network positions.
- 3) Power is determined by structural position. Actors are presumed to initially have equal power and influence.

(Adapted from Lake and Hong 2009: 130-131)

In terms of the structure-agency debate (see McAnulla 2002) SNA places itself on the diametrically opposite position of rational choice; structure is systematically given precedence over agency. The direction of causality is exclusively from structure to agency- and from structure to outcome. (Hafner-Burton, Kahler et al. 2009; Lake and Hong 2009). Because of this, combining SNA with political analysis, where agency is usually considered causally prior to structure (see eg. Malnes 2008)- can be somewhat problematic.

4.3 SNA: Relevant for Humanitarian Governance?

Let us begin with the case for SNA's relevance for humanitarian governance. First, humanitarianism is a field which can be described as neither as a market, hierarchy, nor a Hobbesian anarchy. Affiliations are voluntary and cannot be forced. Relational

power becomes important: you can only influence the outcome by participating- and only have high influence if your participation is vital to the success of the governance initiative. SNA is well suited for this form of power analysis. Secondly, while humanitarian organisations vary in size- an efficient governance mechanism needs a broad support in order to be successful. Admittedly, the loss of distinction between organisations of different size is formidable -influencing the actions of large scale actors will necessarily have greater impact on the field as a whole.

Hafner-Burton, Kahler et al. (2009) warn against an unmindful import of the network analysis tool-kit into IR. SNA provides temptingly precise measures of relations, but the meanings of these measures need to be analysed in context. Because SNA is a formal mathematical method, applying the method requires a detailed understanding, not only of core concepts, but on how the mathematical measure will interact with the registered data. They note a tendency in the existing literature of using measures as indicators without due care to the underlying assumptions:

"Currently, international relations research too often deploys network concepts and theories that are inappropriate or grounded in unproven assumptions. Selective extension of existing theory and findings to international relations may also be misleading. [...]scholars have made theoretical leaps, equating homophily with positive ties and structural equivalence with affinity; yet either or both may lead to competition instead of cooperation."

While SNA does provide a precise means of analysing relational power in humanitarian governance- it is well worth remembering that this is also the only aspect it can capture. While it makes sense to see relational power as an important element in humanitarian governance, it does not necessarily lend itself to analysis when isolated from the core components of agency, interest and legitimacy. What of the interaction between different components of power in the humanitarian field? Can relational power, removed from all other considerations, still be seen as a relevant measure? If relational power is best viewed as potential power in isolation, and depends on other power resources to manifest in outcomes, SNA will provide a poor picture of the

actual power distribution within the field.

4.4 Resolving the issues: Three-pronged analytical approach

I have argued that the crucial form of power in the humanitarian governance network is relational power. However, this claim cannot be substantiated solely by illustrating that relational power is unevenly dispersed in the network. Identifying powerful actors in terms of participation, reach and brokerage- is dependent on substantial evidence that the agency model fits. While it is possible to test agency models on network data: through so called Agent-Based-Modelling (see Bonabeau 2002). I have neither the available time, nor the quality of data, necessary for such an approach. Instead I have chosen to triangulate the methods used to study the network. In order to avoid the problems derived from the structural bias of SNA, I will conducted a three-pronged method of analysis. First to uncover if the observed structure conforms to my theoretical assumptions. Secondly to uncover whether there is ground for a structural analysis in the observed form of agency. Finally, I will produce and evaluate the measures of relational power compared to the findings in the two previous sections.

4.4.1 Analysis Part-1 The transnational humanitarian anarchy

The qualities of the humanitarian governance network as a structure can reveal whether the assumptions inherent in the theory make themselves relevant. In the theory chapter I presented three hypothesis of how the network should manifests itself given the theory:

H1: The humanitarian governance network will have hierarchical tendencies

H2: The hierarchical tendencies of the humanitarian governance network will decline as one trims the network boundaries towards the core network.

H3: There will be at least 32 unique constellations of membership in the humanitarian governance network.

Counting the number of constellations of memberships is a self-explanatory measure. However, the latter two of these hypothesis require little additional specification.

Consider the diagram below. It can be seen as a typical depiction of a hierarchy. The arrows denote the direction of command- the top node is in control of the entire network, via two mid-level management nodes.




Illustration 1: Ideal Hierarchy

Krackhardt (1994) developed a set of measures derived from the core components of this network. He argues that an ideal hierarchy is characterised by four main features: First, they are fully connected, so that no node is isolated from the chain of command. Secondly, it is hierarchic, by which Krackhardt implies the absence of reciprocal ties. Reciprocity of relations is presumed to remove hierarchy, as command cannot move two ways. The third component is efficiency, that any single node must answer only to one other node. If a node has more than one boss, this reduces the efficiency of the hierarchy. The final criteria is that there must be an ultimate end-node for the hierarchy- that is there must be an ultimate boss. Krackhardt calls this measure Least Upper Bound- denoting the position of the ultimate node in the network. Krackhardt's four measures range from 1 (perfect fit) to zero (total disorder) along these four dimensions.

(Krackhardt 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005)

The analysis will be repeated on different datasets that approach the central governing network- in order to see how hierarchical tendencies are distributed throughout the network. Instead of over-complicating the measures of “coreness”⁵ in each network- I

5 In SNA the centre of a network is often referred to as the core defined in contrast to the periphery. Measures of coreness have been developed, (see Borgatti and Everett 1999) but in the context of this analysis they would only serve to confuse the results.

have used a simple measure to limit the network towards the core. The first is a dataset including all organisations with membership in more than one governing mechanism, the second is a dataset including all nodes with membership in more than three governing mechanisms, and the final measurement is conducted on the relations between the governing mechanisms.

4.4.2 Analysis Part 2- Agency in the humanitarian governance network

Lake and Wendy (2009: 133) argue that "[p]ower may be weakest and, paradoxically, most important in the earliest stages of network formation." At the outset, in this case the humanitarian community before Rwanda 1994, there is no real governance network to speak of. From 1994, until today⁶, humanitarian organisations have chosen to associate in a variety of different ways: producing the governance structure which is the subject of this analysis. If it can be shown that their choices during this process lend themselves easily to an analysis based on the integrative model- this can substantiate the claim that relational power is of importance. The hypotheses 4-7 in derived from the theory (see above) are those relevant for this part of the analysis:

H4: Humanitarian organisations will value legitimacy over funding concerns when they interact with the humanitarian governance network.

H5: The modus operandi of the humanitarian organisations will influence their desired outcomes from the governing mechanisms.

H6: The humanitarian organisations will attempt strategic use of their relational power resources to exert influence over the humanitarian governing mechanisms.

H7: The success or failure of attempts to strategically manipulate the humanitarian governance network should in be explainable as an outcome of available relational power resources.

6 To be precise: the period between January and April 2012 when the network data was sampled and cross-checked.

In order to test these hypothesis- four organisations were chosen: OCHA, MSF, CARE, and OFADEC. These organisations differ along several dimensions. OCHA is the only IGO, while the others are NGOs. CARE is often described as the "quintessential Wilsonian" (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 33) organisation, whereas MSF are typical for a Solidarist organisation- and follow the Dunantist tradition of independence from states. Finally OFADEC is virtually non-comparable to the three former agencies. They are a small African NGO- which has managed to secure a central position in the governance network. Following the histories of these four organisations will provide an indication of whether the presumed commonalities in agency are fitting for all humanitarian organisations. As they are about as different from each other as humanitarian organisations can be, finding comparable manifestations of agency between these- strengthens the case for the integrative model of humanitarian agency.

4.5 Analysis Part-3: Operative definitions of relational power

Power, in social network analysis is based on theoretical analysis of how different positions in a network structure can provide advantage. As has been discussed, all nodes are implicitly assumed to have the same power and influence- prior to their position in the network. The power resources are seen as endogenous to the network. Several different theoretical approaches exist for power in social networks. Coercive power can occur when a central node threatens to sever the link to a weakly connected node (see Granovetter 1973); or influence can be exerted through filtering the information passed along- or the principles endorsed (see Milward and Provan 1998). It is also been shown that central nodes can control the development of the network by setting conditions on participation. They can set the agenda, control participation and define the areas of governance- making it more likely that they will achieve their desired outcome (see Lake and Hong 2009: 138-45). Another power manoeuvre is that the central nodes can flock together, effectively establishing a centre of governors controlling a periphery of the governed (see e.g. Smith and White 1992). Frequently, power in social networks is seen as a form of centrality. However, there are several different theoretical justifications for the importance of centrality,

accompanied by different algorithms for its' measure. In the theory chapter three elements of relational power were described: participation, brokerage and reach. In the following I will show how these can be operationalised in terms of empirical SNA.

4.5.1 Participation

If an organisation is to have influence over the development of a governance mechanism- the first criteria is that it must participate in the discussion of the initiative. Likewise, if a governance mechanism is to impact the humanitarian field- it is dependent on collaboration of organisations. Edges in this network are membership, defined as the opportunity to influence traded for a commitment to the outcome. So a simple measure of how many memberships an organisation has in the network, and how many members the governance mechanisms have, is a good operationalisation of how many other nodes in the network they have the potential to influence. The number of edges a node has is usually referred to as a degree. There is an important distinction between governance mechanisms on, the one hand and organisations on the other- as membership has a different meaning depending on whether it is membership *in* or member ship *of*.

For the initial in depth analysis- participation will be examined by taking a look at the ego-network of the organisations, that is- all the nodes with which an organisation shares an edge and all the edges between those nodes. An in depth analysis of the nature of the relationships denoted as membership from the organisation- as well as an evaluation of that organisations ability to influence the governance mechanism, will provide a clearer image of how the organisations can influence through membership, and how their power resources can be utilised.

For the analysis of the entire network, participation can be operationalised as the degree centrality. The degree, as mentioned, is the number of edges attached to a node. Freeman's (1979) degree centrality is nothing more than a nominalised expression of degree. Let C_{vi} denote the number of edges connected to a node, and C_{max} denote the theoretical maximum number of edges:

$$DC = \sum 1 - \left(\frac{C_{max} - C_{vi}}{C_{max}} \right)$$

However, as the data in this case is substantively 2-mode. That is, ICRC can be a member of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), while the IASC cannot be a member of ICRC. So the theoretical maximum of possible of connections is different for the first and second mode of data. Conducting the calculation on the first mode of the 2-mode dataset requires separate calculation for the governance mechanisms and humanitarian organisations. For the governance mechanisms $C_{max}=645$ (the number of humanitarian organisations in the dataset), while for the humanitarian organisations $C_{max}=16$ (the number of governance mechanisms in the dataset). As the nominalisation is different- the two DC-measures are not directly comparable. (See Borgatti and Everett 1997)

This is the first measure of degree centrality. Another core component of participation is how many other organisations the ego interacts with *through* the governance mechanisms. That is- how many actors they have the potential to influence when participating in the governance mechanism. This is the second measure of degree centrality.

4.5.2 Brokerage

Brokerage was first introduced by Granovetter (1973) whose initial observation was that weak ties that served as the only bridge between two groups had a high “cohesive power”. While Granovetter wrote with friendship between individual people in mind- the idea that a weak connection between two cliques of nodes could be important in social networks proved an important observation. This was later developed into the concept of brokerage and the parallel measure of betweenness. Whereas the degree centrality only measures the potential to exert influence- betweenness is a power-resource in itself. Consider the diagram below:




Illustration 2: Brokerage visualised

Let the nodes be actors desiring influence and the edges be communication. If Gamma wishes to influence the actions of Epsilon, the only way to convey that influence is via Alpha. This puts Alpha in a privileged position, as Alpha can choose whether to convey the influence or not. If Zeta, Delta, Epsilon and Beta have agreed on a common strategy, they are dependent on Alpha's support, not only to include Alpha in the strategy, but also to include Gamma. Likewise, if Epsilon wishes to influence Beta- it must either be via Delta or Alpha. Occupying a position on the geodesic path -the shortest route- between nodes puts the actor in a position to act as broker. A broker can choose whether or not to convey information or exert influence. The threat of exit is also more efficient for a broker. Consider the consequences for the network if Alpha were to withdraw. Gamma would be completely isolated, and Delta become the only point of connection between the other nodes.

(Adapted from Freeman 1979: 220-22; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Lake and Hong 2009: 132)

For the in-depth analysis I will investigate the concept of brokerage rather than its' formal definition. The focus will be on how organisations can use their potential to influence others as a bargaining chip- and how this strategy succeeds or fails. The dataset only registers ties between organisations as forms of membership- so while I will use the data to show how egos reach can be extended via key brokers, the

identification of key brokers will not be mathematical. I will focus on the actors that are widely recognised as highly legitimate and influential- and let myself be guided by previous case studies.

For the mathematical investigation of all position in the network the concept of brokerage must necessarily be formalised. Let us say that the position of brokerage can exist in both pure forms and partial forms. That is, the influence that can be exerted through brokerage is highest when a node occupies a position on the *only* geodesic path between two points. However, if there is another geodesic path occupied by another node- this does not cancel the brokerage. The brokerage is merely halved- as the advantage is now shared with another. This is justified by the assumption that nodes are indifferent as to which geodesic path they use. Freeman (Freeman 1979) sees this as a probability of brokerage bearing relevance, where it is 1/2 when shared with one, and 1/3 when shared with two. Extending this thought leads to the conclusion that the brokerage is a fourth if shared with three nodes; a fifth if shared with four.

Consider diagram 2. again: Alpha is situated on the only path between Epsilon, Zeta Delta and Beta, and Gamma. There are, in other words, four instances where Alpha is a pure broker. Additionally, Alpha is on one of two possible paths between Epsilon and Beta. Since there is also a path between these two and Delta, this is only half a brokerage. Likewise, Alpha holds a position on the path between Epsilon and Zeta, as well as Beta and Zeta. These positions are shared with Delta rendering it two additional half brokerages. This allows for a formal quantification of Alpha's position of brokerage- defined as the sum of all proportions of positions occupied on the geodesic paths. In this case Alpha's betweenness degree is 5,5. Betweenness, in short, is a measure of the number of times a node occurs on a geodesic path between other nodes.

(Adapted from Freeman 1979; Hanneman and Riddle 2005)

To provide a formal description of Betweenness Centrality (BC) for the ego-node (k):

Let, g_{ij} denote all geodesic paths between i and j and let g_{ij}^k denote all

occurrences of k along the geodesic path between i and j .

The proportion of geodesic paths that go from i to j via k is denoted by P_k , so that,

$$P_k = \frac{g_{ij}^k}{g_{ij}}$$

To produce a total measurement of betweenness for k the P_k is calculated for all i and j where $i \neq j \neq k$, when direct edges are absent:

$$BC_k = \sum_i^n \sum_j^n P_k$$

The measure is then nominalised by:

$$nom BC_k = \frac{BC_k}{n^2 - 3n - 2}$$

(Freeman 1979: 222-4)

The product is a measurement of all occurrences of betweenness positions, or all occurrences where a node can act as broker. This analysis is conducted on two different datasets: the first analysis is on the first mode of the 2-mode dataset transposed to an affiliations matrix, the second on the scale-free network. These measures weigh brokerage under to different theoretical assumptions. The first mode of the 2-mode dataset measures the organisations positions as brokers between governance mechanisms. That is- the extent to which organisations can choose to confer the conclusions from one forum to the other, and the importance of that role. A major disadvantage of this measure is that the direct ties between the second mode nodes (governance mechanisms) is not included- potentially providing an exaggeration of the brokerage in cases where the organisation is a member of two governance mechanisms that are themselves connected in the second mode. The second measurement of centrality does not have this issue, but it does have others. By applying the betweenness centrality measure on the scale-free network, one assumes the ontological equivalence between level 1 and 2 actors. This does not actually present a problem for the measure of BC, but it is problematic with regards to the

nominalisation of the measure. There is a substantive difference with regards to the maximum possible number of connections to the level one and level two nodes. A governing mechanism can have 656 members, while the organisations can only be members of 16 governing mechanisms. However, this problem is most relevant if measures are to be compared between networks. In this thesis it is substantively defensible to regard both level 1 and level 2 nodes as governing actors. In order emphasises this- the network is symmetrised prior to analysis so that membership is shown to potentially convey influence in both directions. For the Scale-free analysis of brokerage: governing mechanisms and humanitarian organisations are presumed to be ontologically equivalent as actors with a potential to exert influence on humanitarian governance.

4.5.3 Reach

Reach was described as the ability to extend ones reach of influence to a number of actors outside those with which one has direct contact. That is- the use of other node's ego-networks to ones own advantage. If an actor is able to motivate other actors with which it has direct contact, to comply with a governance initiative, then they might also be persuaded to advocate the initiative to the actors with which they are connected. Those reached in the second degree network -can in turn persuade others in their networks, and so on and so forth. It is, in other words, not just how many organisations ego has can influence , it is also how many they in turn can influence at egos behest. In order to evaluate ego's reach one has to analyse egos position with regards to diffusion of a governance initiative.

For the in depth analysis I will focus on the egos use of key actors in promoting different instruments of governance. How they can rally those with which they have contact, and how these in turn can aid in the spread of a governance initiative. How effective is the use of a relatively small ego-network of well connected nodes? The data for diffusion of governance initiatives is not of a very high quality, but some earlier case studies to give an insight into how the concept of reach might function in the humanitarian network.

For the mathematical analysis this concept too must be formalised in a measure. Consider the above discussion on the role of brokerage. If power is gained by serving as a broker- then the use of brokers must necessarily entail less power than via direct contact. Assuming divergent interests, power must be a relative term. A gain in advantage of one node is followed by the proportionate disadvantage of another. How can reach then be operationalised as a source of power? Let me try to offer a solution: Initially any actor that can be reached, directly or otherwise, is an actor that can potentially be influenced. For each broker necessary to make the reach, part of the that potential influence is altered into a power resource for the broker. That is, for each step a loss of influence in the ego becomes a gain in influence by the broker. The measure of Reach Centrality allows for a formalisation of this loss:

RC is a measure of the number of nodes reached by extending the ego-network by k steps. To reflect the loss of influence subtracted by the broker, the additional number of nodes reached at k degrees is divided by k . This makes sense as the maximal gain for the broker is 1 -if more brokers are present on the geodesic path- the value 1 is divided evenly among them, incurring no extra costs on ego.

An additional question that needs to be addressed with regards to reach is direction. There is a distinction between a node being a member off and a node having another as member. Do these direction carry a substantively different meaning when considering reach? Will Oxfam UK have a substantively different ability to spread an initiative to Oxfam International compared to the vice versa? To take another example, will the Sphere project only spread its' standards to the Sphere-board or can the board members also influence the standards? As becomes obvious from these examples- influence through reach is bi-directional. Therefore the analysis will be conducted on a symmetrised dataset- as was done with brokerage. The analysis on the scale-free network is done with the same justification as in brokerage. With regards to scale-free reach: governing mechanisms and humanitarian organisations are seen as ontologically equivalent.

5 Data

5.1 Sampling method

While statistical inferences can be built on randomised sampling methods from a population of known size, the relational nature of social network data means that random samples are not possible. When analysing relations between nodes, the observations are by definition dependent of each other- and cannot in any way be seen as independent observations. As discussed above, the purpose is to analyse a network as a complete structure, making it as much a single case as a large-n method.

Preferably a sample in SNA should include a complete universe. . The point of departure is a fixed list of relevant actors, that clearly define the edges of the network being analysed. From there other methods, like interviews, are used to map out the ties between the relevant actors. For this analysis the preferred sampling method would be a fixed list of humanitarian organisations who respond to the question of which governance mechanisms they participate in.

However, for all intent and purposes the population of international humanitarian organisations is unknown. The figure 2,500 is the most broadly cited estimate of the number of operative humanitarian organisations in the world (see Juma and Suhrke 2002; Barnett and Weiss 2008; Barnett and Weiss 2011). The original source of this estimate is a discontinued roster from 2003, where OCHA registered organisations they interacted with in the field. This list included several temporary organisations and local NGOs that were established at an ad hoc basis in response to a specific catastrophe. Barnett and Weiss (2008: 30) concludes that within the extensive list, only about 260 organisations can be deemed "serious actors". Neither a list of these actors, nor any clear specification of the term "serious actor", is provided. Another problem is the difficulty in contacting and soliciting response from a large number of organisations. Again SNA differs from statistics. While it is possible to deal with the problems arising from missing values in inferential statistics, missing values are not a resolvable issue in SNA. If the missing node should constitutes a network-broker, the result could be of vital importance for the analysis of the network (see Granovetter

1973). Each node is relevant in relation to the others, leaving a few nodes out of the network would therefore impact the relational attributes of all the others. In using the fixed-list approach, one would have to presume a 100% response rate from the organisations. (Doreian and Woodard 1992: 219)

My alternative approach was to use the membership lists of the governance mechanisms to gather the data. This means that the data was initially registered as 2-mode data: where nodes (humanitarian organisations) are registered by the dichotomy *participating/not participating* for a series of events (global governance mechanisms). A consequence of this sampling approach is that there are no isolates (non-connected nodes) in the dataset. The criteria for node inclusion is membership in a governance mechanism- and as a result all registered nodes are connected to at least one event.

While this eased some of the practical difficulties of data collection, the problem of an unknown population was not resolved. A complete list proved just as difficult to find for humanitarian governance mechanisms- as for the organisations themselves. An initial investigation revealed a tendency for the humanitarian governance mechanisms to be interconnected among themselves- in the form of membership. This makes possible a second-mode snowball, or chain referral, sampling method. This sampling methods has proven particularly useful in reaching hidden, or unknown, populations in sociology (c.f. Biernacki and Waldorf 1981; Penrod, Preston et al. 2003). The idea is that you let an initial sample of actors define the edges of the network by referring you to other actors they see as relevant.

The ego-events, or initial selection of governance mechanisms, refer you to other relevant events in their membership lists. As has been discussed the definition of what constitutes a humanitarian actor is far from over. As Slim(2003) has noted, it is the organisations themselves which provide the distinction between valid and invalid humanitarian actors. Using chain referral by membership can therefore be seen as an effective way of uncovering the population- as defined by the recognition of other humanitarian organisations. An actor is relevant in the humanitarian governance network, if the other actors recognise their relevance.

Using snowballing, as the method is most commonly referred to in the SNA literature, depends on as clear a definition of nodes and edges as possible. The ambition is to uncover an entire network, in this case the entire humanitarian governance network. This can be problematic. Consider the notion of “small worlds”, often popularly summarised as the hypothesis that any two people are connected by six degrees of separation (Newman 2000). In the extreme it can be presumed that following all expanding relational ties from a group of people will- by the sixth repetition- include the entire world population. If one considers Valerie Amos, the under secretary general for humanitarian affairs, a relevant actor, and further believes that she discusses her work at home- should her daughters school friends be considered relevant in the humanitarian governance network? This extreme is obviously a reduction to the absurd, yet the core of the issue remains valid. In order to avoid a data overload, the network needs to be restricted. In order to capture the entirety of a network, this restriction cannot be arbitrary (Lauman, Marsden et al. 1992)

I chose to specify the network edges by organisational membership. Membership is defined as the opportunity to influence, combined with a commitment to the practices, values or standards of the governance mechanism (event). Members of an event, that themselves can be seen as an event, are included in the event list, with their organisational members as nodes. By organisational, I mean that the membership must be of a humanitarian organisation, that is an organisation that at least partially conducts programs to “relieve the suffering of distant strangers”(Barnett and Weiss 2011). More specifically, they should have programs in another country than that in which they are registered. As an additional criteria, the governance mechanisms (events) need to be global, excluding national governance instruments from the analysis. The ego-selection of events should be as broad as possible, and the snowball selection should be limited by these criteria. This was my initial network boundary, but substantive considerations during the actual sampling have led to some moderations.

5.2 Conducting the Sampling

5.2.1 Ego-event selection

The original selection was made by consulting a online database for global civil society governance instruments. This database was compile by One World Trust, who are themselves an NGO that “conducts research, develops recommendations and advocates for reform to make policy and decision-making processes in global governance more accountable” (One World Trust 2011). The database claims to be “the first comprehensive inventory of [...] civil society self-regulatory initiatives worldwide.”(One World Trust 2012). Under the category “humanitarian and emergency relief” fifteen instruments were listed.

However, the list proved disorganised. Instruments of governance- handbooks, standards, best practices and the likes- were seamlessly interchanged with the organisations that created them. Likewise, several instruments were intended for the exchange of information between individual people, rather than governance of entire organisations. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), as an example, turned out be a forum for the exchange of experiences between professionals working with emergency education (INEE 2012). Another issue was that think-tanks producing accountability practices and recommendations for humanitarian relief, were included as governance mechanisms. Groupe URD, though initially created by MSF as an alternative to the formalised SPHERE-project, later evolved into an institute without members (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 15; URD 2012). Likewise the Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) is a sub-institution of of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)- and primarily functions as a publisher of academic findings from the institute to humanitarian professionals (ODI 2012). None of theses came close to complying with the predefined event definition.

The organisations were filtered by my initial event selection criteria- resulting in a selection of eight ego-events. (see Table 1.) However, the organisational relations proved more complex to describe than initially presumed. GHP, for instance, is primarily run by a steering committee, distinct from but including SCHR. This steering

committee drafts policy in between meetings which are held biennially. The outcomes of the broader meetings are the Principles of Partnership: a set of guidelines aimed at improved collaboration between UN and NGO humanitarian organisations (GHP 2012). From a relational perspective, and definitely from a social power perspective, it seemed most fitting to register the two as separate events. Membership in the steering committee provides a greater opportunity to influence than participation in the biennial meetings. According to GHP (2012), the membership is largely determined by the participants of the first meeting in July 2007. As no other membership directory is provided, the participants from this meeting are registered as members of PoP (see GHP 2007).

Another challenge was People in Aid, which is a borderline case between a service-provider and a governance-mechanism. Membership can include the opportunity to influence- via the board of trustees. There is also an annual meeting, where the board is constituted- but these seem to have a low degree of participation- a quorum exists if 10% of the members are represented . (People in Aid 2008) The primary motivation for organisational membership is cost-efficient human resource policies and guidelines. Barnett and Weiss (2011: 117) argue that a key challenge for humanitarian governance is professionalising the sector by keeping employees in the sector for longer periods of time. Human resource policies, not to mention adequate pay, are key to this aspect of humanitarian professionalism. There is also a perceivable collective action problem, as providing adequate compensation to staff, can potentially reduce legitimacy in the eyes of donors. It is hard to convince people to donate, if the average income of the humanitarian employees exceeds the average income of private donors. Joint governance of human resource policies could therefore be a facet of humanitarian governance. People in Aid (PiA) was therefore included in the analysis.

Other problems that emerged related to legal status and organisational governance. The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), which is a very active committee within humanitarian governance (see Stoddard 2003: 4), is not a registered legal entity (c.f. Swiss Federation 2012). The interaction between the organisations is through meetings between the directors of ten major humanitarian organisations.

While they do have a permanent secretary, working out of the IFRC offices in Geneva, I was unable to uncover whether the organisations divided the cost of his salary. Nor is it entirely clear whether the secretary represents the committee in meeting- or if this is divided between the member organisations directors. However, it was possible to confirm that meeting were held at regular intervals. (see IASC 2012) While the details of the inner workings of SCHR might not be readily available- it is non the less clear that the SCHR is an important governance mechanism.

The other selected events were clear-cut cases, see table 1 below.

Name	Coded	Notes
Emergency Capacity Building Project	ECBP	Organisations seeking to improve response time through active partnership between six major NGOs
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response	SPHERE	Minimum standards are the core of the SPHERE-project. The handbooks are used by many who are not among the 18 member organisations (Buchanan-Smith 2003)
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership	HAP	Aims to improve accountability towards beneficiaries
Global Humanitarian Platform	GHP	Here membership of GHP is denoted by membership in the GHP steering committee. This committee works between broad meetings. PoP is the outcome of the broad meetings.
Principles of Partnership	PoP	Member organisation are those participating in the broad biennial meetings of GHP.
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response	SCHR	Represents large NGOs in IASC.
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action	ALNAP	Broad network for establishing accountability practices. State-members are not included.
People in Aid	PiA	Organisation for human resource policies in aid, membership allows influence and provides benefit in HR-support.

Tabell 1: Ego-Events

5.2.2 Second degree referrals

Examining the membership lists quickly revealed a group of umbrella organisations whose membership was present in several mechanisms. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) “is a global network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that advocates for effective humanitarian action.” (ICVA 2012). The ambition of ICVA is to represent all the non-governmental humanitarian NGOs. InterAction is the equivalent umbrella for American NGOs, and Voice for the European. By the formal edge definition, InterAction should have been excluded from the analysis for being a national organisation. However, they are so broadly represented in governance mechanisms, that it seems the humanitarian community have recognised that American NGOs prefer to organise at a national level. Likewise, the membership of VOICE is limited to European NGOs- possibly as their main focus is to represent civil-society interests vis-a-vis the European Commission on Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection (see Voice 2012). This trio of umbrella organisations are broadly used as representatives of the entire humanitarian non-governmental sector. GHP(2012) uses the term “NGOs represented by ICVA, InterAction, SCHR and VOICE.”

Another national association of NGOs which was included was Aktion Hilft- a German association of humanitarian agencies. They are represented solely on the SPHERE-board, but the members included many large international humanitarian NGOs registered in Germany. SPHERE is also considered one of the most influential arenas for humanitarian governance (see Buchanan-Smith 2003). Accurately depicting access to SPHERE seemed of greater importance than strictly adhering to the boundaries of the selection. It should also be noted that while there are only 18 member organisations in SPHERE, 19 have been registered in the datasets. The reason for this is that the representative of the Lutheran World Federation- and chair of the board, Erik Johnson, is a director in Danish Church Aid (SPHERE 2012). Both organisations were listed as a member.

Another deviation from the edge definition was the inclusion of the Inter-Agency

Standing Committee (IASC). Membership was traced in reverse when it became clear that the major function of the SCHR was to represent the NGO community in IASC. Established as early as in 1992, the IASC's core function is to be “the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance [...for] key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners” (IASC 2012). In accordance with UN resolution (UNGA 1992), the IASC is effectively under OCHA control and chairmanship. The most significant contribution from the committee to humanitarian governance has been the establishment of global emergency clusters. The cluster approach entails that the operational responsibility for a certain area of disaster response, such as provision of shelter and management of camps, falls on a pre-specified agency. (McNamara 2006: 10) Clusters themselves have been excluded from this analysis. Beyond the cluster leads, other participating cluster organisations vary with different operational contexts.

The final deviant inclusion is the Humanitarian Forum (HF). Their self-stated key functions are: “capacity building and training; accountability; building bridges; coordination and cooperation; humanitarian standards.” (The Humanitarian Forum 2012). This can certainly be seen as governing activities. The key issue is that the board of directors, which elects itself, have legal rights to control every aspect of the organisation's activities. The Directors are only held accountable, under UK law, to the mandate of the organisation. (Humanitarian Forum 2006; The Humanitarian Forum 2012) While the relationship to the steering committee is formally subject to the board, they do have certain rights under the memorandum. (Humanitarian Forum 2006) This committee consists of some major international-western- Christian- and Islamic humanitarian organisations (Wahid 2012). While they do not formally control the organisation “their informal role- their perspectives, legitimacy and connections- are more important” (Shaw-Hamilton 2012). Another clear substantive issue, in favour of inclusion, is that the analysis so far had included very few Islamic humanitarian actors. The attending organisations in the steering committee were therefore registered as members, and HF included as an event in the analysis.

The second degree referral eventually led to the selection of seven additional events summarised in Table 2.

Name	Coding	Notes
InterAction	InterAction	American NGO umbrella
Voice	Voice	European NGO umbrella
International Council of Voluntary Agencies	ICVA	Global NGO umbrella
Action of Churches Together Alliance	ACT-Alliance	Alliance of christian faith-based humanitarian organisations
Aktion Hilft	Aktion Hilft	German NGO umbrella
Inter-Agency Standing Committee	IASC	OCHA controlled coordination council for UN- Red Cross/Crescent- and non-governmental, organisations
The Humanitarian Forum	HF	Seeks to coordinated between Western, multilateral and Islamic humanitarian actors. Focus on local partnerships. Run by selected member organisations

Tabell 2: Second-degree referral

5.2.3 Third degree referrals

By the third degree referrals it seemed clear that the humanitarian governance network was nearing exhaustion. Following the thread of HF led to a series of national organisations, funded by HF, seeking to build umbrella organisations for national associations in beneficiary countries. While these might be a relevant part of HF's ego-network, it is clear that the organisational members were exclusively national organisations. Tracing members in InterAction led to a whole series of advocacy alliances for US-NGOs, none of which seemed particularly relevant. A grey-zone case was the Alliance to End Hunger. Their activities include brokering “unique partnerships between [their] members [to] leverage their efforts to benefit the hungry people they serve” (Alliance to End Hunger 2012). However, their primary mandate is to build “the public and political will to end hunger at home and abroad.”(Alliance to End Hunger 2012). The need to specify “abroad” seems to indicate that the organisations primary relevance is to domestic US-policy.

In the end, only one addition was made in the third degree referrals: the Australian

Council for International Development (ACFID). This too was a grey-zone consideration. ACFID, as is clear from its name, has a wider purpose than the purely humanitarian. Their ambition is to “attain a world where gross inequality and extreme poverty are eradicated” (ACFID 2012), which seems to fall outside the immediacy criteria for humanitarian relief. However, the umbrella organisation is a member of ICVA, which is specifically related to the humanitarian. They also hold an associated membership in HAP International. While many of the organisational members of ACFID can best be described as developmental in approach, some, like the Emergency Architects of Australia, have a clearly humanitarian profile. Considering the unclear boundaries between development and humanitarianism, and as InterAction had already been included, it was decided to include ACFID in the analysis. They are not registered as members of HAP- as associated membership is excluded from the analysis. The grounds for this is that their opportunity to influence is limited.

5.2.4 Concluding note on sampling

The intention behind sampling in SNA is to uncover a complete network: "the presumption is that such a network exists and the data collection task is to obtain a veridical image of it"(Doreian and Woodard 1992: 216). While an attempt was made at delineating the network boundaries in advance of sampling, the actual network did not fit the presumed qualities. When reality and theoretical presuppositions come in conflict, I find it safer to err on the side of reality. By choosing to stretch the criteria of inclusion- the selection process has become slightly more arbitrary. I can no longer claim to have uncovered a complete social network given the specified edge definition. However, the sampled network does fit better with the governance network as it is presented in the literature (see Macrae and Harmer 2003; Stoddard 2003; Borton 2009). The sacrifice of the the clear delineation of *a* social network was made to come closer to the ideal of *the* humanitarian governance network.

6 Analysis Part- 1 The humanitarian governance network.

The diagram below is a depiction of the network as a whole. How well does the structure correspond to the theory? The first impression is that there are several nodes connected only to a singular event. Another impression is that there seems to be a core of organisations in the centre- intertwined in a complex web of relations, while the periphery is primarily consists of loosely connected nodes. The image does bring to mind Kropotkin's (1910) description of “the complex web of voluntary associations would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations.” But how well does it reflect the assumptions made in the theory? Is this a non-hierarchical hierarchy? Do the organisations choose membership in a sufficiently varied manner to indicate a complex combination of diverging interests? In this first part of the analysis I investigate the questions of hierarchy and membership constellations to see if the network below fits the assumptions from the theory.




Illustration 3: Scale Free Governance Network

6.1 Divergent interests and unique constellations

Calculating the number of unique constellations in the network in UCINET (Borgatti, Everett et al. 2002) gives us the number of unique combinations of membership for organisations as 87. Of these a substantial number of organisations are only members of a single event. ActionAid has 148 members otherwise unconnected to the network, the Act-Alliance has 98, VOICE has 96, and ACFID 54. All the other governing mechanisms, with the exception of SCHR, IASC, ECBP, have some otherwise unconnected nodes. The Table 3. below summarises the most frequent membership combinations for more than two organisations:

Combination	Frequency
<i>PiA, ICVA</i>	16
<i>PiA, ACFID</i>	10
<i>PiA, VOICE, HAP</i>	5
<i>IASC, ICVA</i>	5
<i>PiA, IASC</i>	4
<i>ALNAP, PoP, VOICE,</i>	4
<i>HAP, ICVA</i>	4
<i>PiA, ICVA</i>	4

Tabell 3: Membership Combinations

In addition to other combinations with frequencies below four, there are 53 unique constellations of membership represented in the dataset. Assuming that all organisations are aware of the other initiatives, and further assuming that they are openly allowed to join all mechanisms⁷, this would indicate the existence of 53 unique sets of interests with regards to humanitarian governance.

In the theory chapter it was assumed that the number of unique constellations would at least exceed 32- which the measured data does. However, the large number of organisations tied to a single governing mechanism- and the clear dominance of regional consortia, might indicate that the most relevant cleavages are regional. Another implication of this is that the humanitarian transnational anarchy might be more hierarchical than initially presumed. Perhaps the regional consortia function as representatives of the larger fauna in governing mechanisms- thereby making a hierarchical logic more applicable to studying humanitarian governance. None the less I find the criteria specified in hypothesis 1 sufficiently satisfied.

6.2 Non-Hierarchical hierarchy

In table 4 below the indicators of the ideal hierarchy are summarised for the network of organisations being members of more than one governing mechanism, more than three governing mechanisms, and for the network between the governing mechanisms themselves. The measures are a lot higher than I had anticipated. The network with of

⁷ Which would be a faulty assumption. See Data Sampling chapter.

organisations with a degree above one, is only slightly divergent from the ideal form of the perfect hierarchy. However, the connectedness measure is an automorphism of the snowball sampling method. As governing mechanisms were uncovered by referrals- it is only logical that the network should be perfectly connected. The disconnectedness of the inter-governance mechanism network is a consequence of unconnected node in the ego-event selection. Likewise, hierarchy is the measure of the proportion of symmetrical ties. Reciprocal membership would come close to being a contradiction in terms, in the network the only reciprocal tie is that between the General Humanitarian Platform and the Principles of partnership.

Scale-free network	Degree above 1	Degree above 3	Governing Mechanisms
Connectedness	<i>1.0000</i>	<i>1.0000</i>	<i>0.7583</i>
Hierarchy	<i>0.9994</i>	<i>0.9973</i>	<i>0.9697</i>
Efficiency	<i>0.9829</i>	<i>0.8831</i>	<i>0.8718</i>
LUB	<i>0.9829</i>	<i>0.9344</i>	<i>0.6282</i>
<i>NB: The GTD Krackhardt calculation was attempted applied to the entire scale free-network. However, the algorithm proved too heavy to apply to such a large dataset (see Appendix A), and the results produced were clearly erroneous. This measure was therefore not included.</i>			

Tabell 4: Hierarchy towards the centre

However, efficiency, that is the extent to which organisations are organised as responding to a single governing entity, does carry substantive meaning in this case. Presumably high membership in regional consortia have had their influence on the lower levels. The measure does decrease substantially as the network is reduced towards the core, indicating that the efficiency of the network drops towards higher levels of governance. Finally the Least Upper Bound is a measure of the extent to which all actors in the network could possibly answer to the same ego-node. The high value of this measure is not produced by a logical leading mechanism- such as OCHA's Inter-Agency-Standing Committee- but is rather the a consequence of the complex interconnections between governance mechanisms. Sphere has InterAction and ICVA as members, in addition to the Act-Alliance. This membership is conferred to ALNAP by their membership there. Likewise HAP has ACFID and VOICE as members, they are also members of ALNAP. So ALNAP is at the end of the line for

all the major consortia, and includes most major organisations in the network. They are therefore the least upper bound and capture 98% of the network in their potentially hierarchical position. However, as the network is limited towards more central actors- this position is decreased and the possible least upper bound is reduced to 63% in the inter-mechanism network.

While the degree of hierarchy is high, it is hard to estimate precisely how high. While some scholars have attempted to describe a bell-curve of the distribution of hierarchy in random networks, it has been found that the factors influencing hierarchy are many (see Brigham, Butts et al. 1999). Should the results be corrected for network density? Should it be corrected for the number of nodes? In effect, the network hierarchy in humanitarian governance can only be an absolute measure compared to the random distribution of hierarchy in humanitarian governance networks. As there is only one such network- this is not an option.

Suffice to say that the structure does fit the assumptions of the model. The hierarchy measured here is not qualitative, but only captures the existence of a possible hierarchy. The initially hierarchical nature of the network decreases as one approaches the core. Among the governing mechanisms there is no plausible way in which an effective hierarchy could even potentially exist. In short, I find the criteria specified in hypothesis 2 and 3 sufficiently fulfilled.

7 Analysis Part-2: Humanitarian Agency

The diagrams used in the qualitative analysis limit number of nodes by only including organisations with membership in two or more higher level entities. This was a necessity brought on by limitations to the number of nodes which could be included with labels. Qualitative explorations and diagrams are produced in Netdraw (Borgatti 2002).

7.1 DHA/OCHA: With a License To Govern

7.1.1 DHAs Initial Power Capital

OCHA was established in 1992 under as a consequence of the recommendations in UN General Assembly resolution . The ambitions on behalf of the newly established "high-level official" were enormous. On behalf of the Sectary General, the humanitarian affairs official was to coordinate the UN agencies and NGOs at a central level, as well as oversea and coordinate between NGOs, UN-agencies, and "all all locally or regionally available relief capacities". This was to be done in a manner which ensured a "speedy transition from relief to development". (UNGA 1992) The DHA was, essentially, tasked with resolving all the issues of lacking governance of the sector as they were perceived in 1991-2 (Tsui and Myint-U 2004). Considering the daunting nature of their task, the DHA were given precious few power resources.

Consider the available power capital for the DHA in 1992: When the "high-ranking official" had been established as the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)- the position was placed at the level of Under-secretary-general- the same rank provided for the heads of the UN humanitarian agencies.⁸ In other words, the ERC did not outrank any of the UN agency heads. This was in terms of formal rank. Informally, the UNDP Under-secretary-general is considered the third most powerful within the UN-system, as the position controls the largest budget. DHA's mandate to coordinate did not seem to require a large budget. Some limited field presence in to coordinate nationally, and offices in New York and Geneva, require little funding compared to the the giants like WFP, UNDP, and UNHCR. As a consequence, the ERC was actually asked to coordinate the efforts of other under secretary generals with formal equivalent ranks, yet who out-ranked him⁹ informally. (see Natsios 1995)

Vis-a-vis the NGOs, DHA had vague mandate to serve "as a central focal point" between them and the relevant governments and IGOs. Another source of potential

8 High Commisioners, and other leaders of specialised agencies, hold the equivalent rank of Under-secretary-general in the UN-system (UN Secretary General 1997)

9 Jan Kenneth Eliasson: ERC from 1992-1994

influence was via the IASC. The standing committee was intended to serve as a coordination mechanism between all humanitarian NGOs and IGOs, and was specifically placed under the chairmanship of the ERC. Beyond chairmanship, the ERC was given no formal powers. The ERC was to exert influence "through consultations" in the capacity as chair of IASC. (UNGA 1992) While the promised "Consolidated Appeals Process" (UNGA 1992) did hold some potential leverage over funding, it was never effectively utilised- and never became a real power source for DHA. When you add the factors of limited field presence, no formal power, very limited funding, and relatively under-qualified staff (Weiss 1998), it is a small wonder that the DHA "made little practical difference in humanitarian crises" (Sending and Stensland 2011: 13).

7.1.2 DHA post-Rwanda: Entering the game of humanitarian governance

The JEEAR report- which became the major driving force behind humanitarian governance, did not involve DHA before very late in the process. Initiated and chaired by the Danish Development Agency (Danida) the JEEAR Steering Committee included DHA, en-par with other UN-agencies, among 38 state, NGO, and IGO stakeholders. (Borton 2004) Nor did the findings give DHA any voice of authority. During the Rwanda crisis, an *ad hoc* coordination organ, UN Rwanda Emergency Response Office (UNREO), had been established as a joint endeavour between UNDP and DHA. This created much confusion on the ground as DHA and UNREO both perceived it as their task to coordinate. (ODI 1996: 19) Nor had DHA fulfilled any of its' obligations to aid in coordination of the NGO community. In the end the NGO coordination office was instigated, not by DHA, but by ICVA. (von Bernuth 1996). To summarise the findings of JEEAR with regards to DHA: the organisation would only be able to fulfil its' function if it became better staffed, better funded, and was given more control external funding and greater authority over the other UN-agencies (ODI 1996)

In the years after JEEAR, the DHA focused its activities on trying to establish authority vis-a-vis other UN-agencies. The activities centred around identifying

"protection gaps" where groups like the internally displaced (IDPs) fell outside of any clear agency protection mandate.(McNamara 2006: 1-2) The operative UN-agencies were as active on the "humanitarian market place"(Smilie and Minear 2004) as other organisations- and so the DHA also focused its' efforts on trying to make CAP work. While the NGO community was establishing new governance mechanisms -and expanding others- DHA was primarily preoccupied by inter-UN debates. (Kent 2004) And so the DHA remained at the outskirts of the governance network.

While the DHA might have had a hard time asserting authority within the UN system, it soon became apparent that the NGO community could no longer be ignored. Attempts at establishing a steering committee for the IASC, were hampered by DHA's demand that there only be one representative of the non-governmental community. DHA tried to force the issue, but in the end had to report its' inability to establish a steering committee "owing to the strong opposition of the agencies not included in the proposed list of members" (ECOSOC 2000)¹⁰. In 1998 the internal oversight committee demanded that DHA pay more attention to the external developments within humanitarian governance. In a somewhat crass manner it was indicated that the DHA should endeavour for "a minimum of coordination with other initiatives." They also made it clear that DHA should pursue "the adoption of guidelines and standards, within the framework of the non-governmental organizations outside the UN system." (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 1998) The DHA responded in its' report to ECOSOC, that they had participated in the Sphere-project (ECOSOC 2000). This was a slight exaggeration- they had only had two meeting with the initiators, which remained their sole contribution to the project (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 32-33). None the less, DHA recommended broad implementation of the Sphere standards throughout the UN humanitarian system. In short, the UN mandated governors of humanitarianism found themselves in a position where they were increasingly being governed by a community they knew little about. Humanitarian governance was growing- and DHA had been side-lined. Their attempts at asserting authority through

10 While the report to ECOSOC was made in 2000- two years after DHA had become OCHA- it was still the Secretary general reporting on DHA activities- written by DHA employees. Such are the intricacies of the UN bureaucracy.

their mandate had failed- something needed to be done.

In 1998 DHA was reorganised into OCHA. This was not a reorganisation aimed specifically at improving relations with the NGO community. However, it can be noted that while DHA had only spoken sporadically of “representatives of the non-governmental community”(c.f. ECOSOC 1997; ECOSOC 2000)¹¹, OCHA clearly listed InterAction, ICVA, and SCHR as members of IASC in their annual reports (c.f. OCHA 1999; OCHA 2001). It had become evident that if OCHA was to establish itself in coordinating function- it needed to rally support outside the confines of the UN-system. Under Jan Egeland, OCHA seemed to realise the potential for governance through the network connections of a few central organisations. That is, making use of the social capital of the other humanitarian organisations who were eager for greater participation within a UN-framework. In 2004 OCHA ordered a report that would investigate possibilities for broader sector wide coordination. A key finding of this report was that:

“The three international humanitarian networks examined (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs), as well as the IOM, remain vertical to each other within each network and collaboration between the networks needs to be considerably improved.”

(Adinolfi, Bassiouni et al. 2005: 9)


So when OCHA began the work on the cluster-approach, it made a greater use of the NGO-community than before. The cluster-approach entails a that an agency is given mandate to coordinate, and responsibility to oversee, the service delivery within one area of humanitarian relief. This system is dependent on a broad acceptance of the cluster-leads role among all humanitarian organisations. In order to ensure NGO support for the approach, OCHA instigated the General Humanitarian Platform, where several major NGOs participated- and OCHA was the only UN-agency. This project culminated in the the Principles of Partnership in 2007, where 36 NGOs pledged their support to the principles. Among the principles was a commitment to the equality of the actors and a “mutual respect between members of the partnership irrespective of size and power.”(Global Humanitarian

¹¹ The Secretary General makes the report to ECOSOC on behalf of the DHA.

Platform 2007)

Prior to the GHP and the principles of partnership there had been some initial skepticism towards the cluster-approach. It was considered a UN-centric empty reform. However, by the end of 2007 this scepticism had been greatly alleviated (Steets, Grünewald et al. 2010: 71). NGOs and UN-agencies were cooperating better and there was a widespread acceptance for the cluster framework. In August 2011 the cluster approach was used in 44 different countries with UN-emergency personnel present (OneResponse 2012). The latest evaluation report concludes that "the benefits generated by the cluster approach to date already slightly outweigh its costs and shortcomings"(Steets, Grünewald et al. 2010: 74)- which is high praise in a humanitarian evaluation. How can we explain this success?

Consider the diagram below. This is OCHA's so-called ego-network within the scale-free dataset. It is a representation of the nodes with which OCHA has direct contact (membership).




Illustrasjon 4: OCHA ego-network

Now this is not a very impressive network. The scale free representation does rob us of the other members of IASC, which might have given a fuller picture. None the less- the point is that OCHA alone has a somewhat meagre network.

Now let us conduct a thought-experiment. Lets say that the cluster idea was sold to the other participants. The core UN-agencies and IFRC were offered cluster leads- securing their support. What did the NGO-community get? The members of GHP- the steering committee for the Principles of Partnership- certainly had a stake in the

outcome. Being included en-par with OCHA in the move to sell the cluster-approach to the broader NGO-community gave them a vested interest in the outcome. The signatories of the Principles of Partnership had in essence been invited to a broad discussion, and an agreement had been reached committing them to the cluster-approach. So let us include the PoP signatories, the IASC members, and the GHP members in OCHA's cluster-approach network. The diagram below gives a depiction of this extended ego-network:




Illustrasjon 5: Cluster network extended by PoP

This extended ego-network consists of 40 nodes of the 202 in the core network. Roughly 20 % of the core community where now engaged- fairly directly- in the implementation of the cluster-approach. OCHA's ability to successfully implement the cluster-approach is dramatically improved.

Now let us extend this thought with regards to the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). This committee was established already in 1972 and in 2007 included ten major humanitarian actors (IASC 2012). Unlike the broad umbrella organisations like InterAction, Voice and ICVA, membership in SCHR is

limited. The advantage of this small committee is that the members are more actively engaged in the work done on their behalf. The committee plays a central role in the IASC, and was a crucial component of the GHP steering committee. While the broad umbrella organisations might not be able to convince all their members to support an initiative, the participation of the SCHR entails the full support of each organisation. The limited size of the committee allows them to communicate between each other on a regular basis. SCHR was given a central role in the promotion of the Principles of Partnership- and in the marketing of the cluster-approach. The level of their inclusion makes it plausible to assume that the cluster-approach gained support from the ten humanitarian organisations in SCHR. This has a major impact on the cluster-approach network. Including the ego-networks of the SCHR members extends OCHAs cluster-approach network even further:



Illustrasjon 6: Cluster network extended by SCHR

The SCHR ego-network, including the committees membership in the IASC and GHP, have been marked in red. If the organisational members of SCHR actively promoted the cluster-approach 112 nodes would be reached in the cluster-approach network. This means that more than a half of the central network is directly covered. It should be noted that this is in the scale-free network, which means that ties between organisations through shared membership have not been registered. The registered ego-networks for SCHR-members are only first degree neighbourhoods. If, for example, Oxfam were to exert its influence in an ALNAP-meeting- encouraging support for the cluster-initiative from other ALNAP-members- this would mean a second degree neighbourhood. The second degree neighbourhood- in this case- includes 201 nodes, only two nodes short of the entire central network.

To conclude this somewhat technical discussion: the reason OCHA had a relative success with the cluster-approach is that they were able to effectively utilise the connections of the other parties. By actively including organisations- they gave them a stake in the outcome. This enabled OCHA to utilise their ego-networks in addition to its own, allowing for the broader diffusion of humanitarian governance through the cluster-approach. This increased OCHA's ability to exert a governing influence over the network as a whole. However, it should be noted that the other organisations, perhaps especially the members of SCHR, now acted as network-brokers on behalf of OCHA. OCHA's power- in this case- was dependent upon their support.

7.2 MSF: Anti-authoritarianism and governance

7.2.1 MSF's initial power resources

MSF was established in 1971 by a group of Red Cross doctors outraged by the Red Cross's apparent complacency in the face of the genocide committed by the Nigerian army during the Biafra conflict. As has been discussed, this break between the French doctors and the Red Cross, has come to epitomise the cleavage between classicist and solidarist humanitarians. While in principle founded on the idea of neutrality to gain access, the concept of *témoignage* (bearing witness) left them in a position where they combined operative humanitarianism with human rights advocacy. The idea of

neutrality was stretched to its limits. MSF frequently chose to actively support one side of a conflict – and the staff was given ample opportunity to use the organisation as an outlet for their natural political inclinations. Paul Berman (cited in Barnett 2009: 650) has joked that the MSF is "a sort of medical wing to the world guerilla movement." In addition to being a bit of a rebel against the humanitarian establishment, MSF also proudly opposed states interference in their programs. They believed that actively distancing themselves from state donors would allow them to "speak truth to power, gain access to those in need, and maintain credibility and legitimacy" (Barnett 2009: 650).

(Barnett 2009: 648-50)

MSF's initial power is a bit hard to characterise. A part of it is the sheer size of the organisation. By 1994 MSF already had four associated national organisations and had been operational in most of the world's humanitarian hotspots since 1983 (MSF 2012). Additionally, MSF were among the first organisations to actively embrace a move towards professionalism. Among the first manifestations of the "new humanitarianism" (Barnett and Weiss 2011: 89-104) was MSF's turbulent reorganisation in 1979- eventually leading to a split and the creation of *Médecines de Monde* (MSF 2012). The disagreement that led to the split was whether to prioritise *témoignage* and public relations- or to focus the efficiency, speed and quality of relief delivery. MSF chose a move towards professionalism, whereas *Médecines de Monde* (MdM) chose to oppose the "bureaucrats of misery" and continue their work based on the founding principles (Barnett 2009: 650). In terms of both principles and practice, MSF had been a pioneer within the humanitarian field, granting them a somewhat unique legitimacy in the humanitarian community. While a bit hard to categorise- this is undoubtedly a power resource.

7.2.2 MSF post-Rwanda: unscathed and unchanged

MSF emerged relatively unscathed from the scandalous engagement in Rwanda. Unlike the majority of its' peers, MSF had understood the full extent of the genocide and acted accordingly. While Oxfam and the majority of the humanitarian community

made repeated calls for cease-fire, MSF "called for a military intervention and took out a full page ad in Le Monde that declared, *You cannot stop genocide with doctors*" (Barnett 2009: 651). Eventually MSF "[p]rotesting at the lack of security and the questionable morality of assisting those involved in the genocide, who were now regrouping to continue their struggle, MSF-France withdrew its personnel" (ODI 1996: 45). While controversial at the time (see ODI 1996: 57), MSF's decision to withdraw from the field has later been applauded (see eg. DeWaal 1997: 193-7). The JEEAR report, which became a harsh blow for the humanitarian community, left MSF fairly unscathed. When mentioned, MSF is primarily applauded for their ability to access difficult areas and their foresighted solution to difficult problems (see eg. ODI 1996: 11, 33, 39, 88, 129).


MSF's first involvement in the post-Rwandan governance network was via the Sphere-project. Sphere was born at a meeting instigated by SCHR and attended by all the major humanitarian umbrella organisations, ICVA, InterAction, VOICE, and the ACT-alliance. Among the few individual NGOs invited were the members of SCHR, including MSF. (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 19) MSF were willing to participate as they "initially perceived Sphere to be a relatively low-key exercise to share technical guidelines and policies between different operational agencies" (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 23). However, when it became clear that Sphere had broader ambitions- seeking to establish shared standards of delivery for the entire humanitarian field, MSF became more sceptical. Already in 1998 it became clear that the direction the Sphere project was heading in might weaken the legitimacy of MSFs *modus operandi*. In the closing ceremony of the Sphere project made Dr Orbinski, the MSF president made his misgivings known:

"As an association rooted in civil society, MSF considers itself open and accountable primarily to civil society. Its legitimate authority is therefore informal, and this has its locus relative to the formal legitimacy of state structures and the political nation state system and their formal responsibilities in international law and international humanitarian law. It is in this informal legitimacy where we wish to remain to sometimes engage in a kind of dialectic

relationship with formally state structures around humanitarian action. [original emphasis] (Orbinski 1998)

MSF sought to encourage a new direction, emphasising that technical standards in themselves only served as tools for formal actors such as states. Humanitarianism, as Orbinski (1998) kept repeating, was more than standards and regulations. Orbinski's speech was a discrete warning, a shot of the bow, to indicate that the project was moving in a direction MSF could not follow. It was even hinted that the concerns "were not necessarily unique to MSF."

These concerns were later made a reality. In a closed letter to the board- MSF warned of their imminent withdrawal from the project. Attempts were made at reconciliation and for a short period of time the Sphere-project was in doubts as to how they should proceed: "Should the launch go ahead as planned? How could MSF and other significant humanitarian agencies be kept on board? But eventually the decision was taken to go ahead." (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 15-16). Why was it so easy for Sphere to let MSF go? The diagram below illustrates MSF's position vis-a-vis Sphere. While the entire ego-network of MSF has been include- Spheres ego-network is only to the first degree.



Illustrasjon 7: MSF and Sphere (ego-networks)


The sphere-project was at the centre of the humanitarian governance network. They had all manner of organisations in their board- from faith-based, such as Lutheran World Federation, to classicist, such as the IFRC, and Wilsonians, such as Care International. Nor did the Sphere-project need MSF's contacts via the SHCR- as the other members of the committee were well represented. So there is no wonder that the threat from MSF -in this context- did not bare fruit. However, in an informal capacity, that is outside of formal memberships, MSF had a slightly greater reach.

Prior to withdrawal from the Sphere-project MSF and three other organisations, Action Contra la Faime (ACF), Medecines de Monde (MdM) and Indicateur de Développement Humain (IDH) had begun to organise through an association they called Groupe URD. They hoped to be able to accomplish an alternative form of humanitarian governance that could compete with Sphere. This work finally culminated in a conference to establish the Quality Project. The introduction to the conference proceedings for the Project Quality leave little doubt as to their purpose:

From 1998 to 2000, a number of NGOs joined forces, through the Quality platform, to stand against the standardisation process that was being implemented in the humanitarian sector. The platform was then challenged, at the end of 1999, with the question: "and what do you propose?". The basis of the Quality Project was thus established. (Quality Project 2002)

While definitely dominated by French NGOs, Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (Voice) were also present. ALNAP and MdM were intended participants, but did not send any delegates. (see Quality Project 2002) While the initiative certainly hoped to provide an alternative to Sphere, it never really took off. Today the Quality Project has evolved into COMPAS Qualité - a resource centre without any member organisations, or any solid reach into the humanitarian field. They publish handbooks and tool-kits, as the Sphere-project does, but these are scholarly publications rather than joint standards. (see COMPAS Qualité 2012)

MSF was at the forefront of the anti-Sphere movement within the humanitarian field, but never managed to produce a viable alternative. It is an interesting detail the MdM seemed to loose interest in the Quality Project. While MSF and MdM split because MSF chose to move in the direction of standardised practice, MdM did not seem to want to follow MSF in making a "stand against the standardisation process". An interesting by-note is that while MdM, who did not have a stake in the General Humanitarian Platform (GHP), participated in the Principles of Partnership (PoP)- the MSF, who had a stake via the SCHR, did not. Taking a closer look at the ego-networks of these two organisations shows how opposing their approach to humanitarian governance is:



Illustrasjon 8: Ego network MSF and MdM

While MSF has withdrawn to a voluntary exile with regards to humanitarian governance, MdM seems to have actively pursued influence. The central organisations of MdM is a member of both ICVA and Voice. Additionally, MdM's national associations are separately registered in VOICE- effectively giving MdM 5 votes, out of a total of 82 member organisations, in VOICE. The paradox here is that despite the split between the two organisations, MdM was first willing to follow MSF out of Sphere, then seems to have decided to move towards a broader approach. While the move out Sphere demonstrated MSF's influence over several French NGOs, it might have cost them support when they proved unable to provide a viable alternative.

7.3 Care International: Network Adaptation

7.3.1 Initial Power-resources

CARE has become such a known brand that its original long form, Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, has long been in disuse. None the less, this heritage was important for how the organisation entered the network of humanitarian governance. Initially their primary objective was food aid delivery. They were the intermediary from the US government to a war torn Europe- and a vital instrument of

the Marshal Plan. Their continued growth after Europe's recovery can largely be attributed to the good-will of the American government. Having been instigated as a semi-governmental operation- they did not shy away from promoting state interests. Maintaining their identity as non-governmental humanitarians, CARE still openly "claimed that it furthered US national interests even if it was not its instrument" (Barnett 2009: 641). This meant that their impartiality and neutrality were questionable- but the sheer size of the organisation still made them a major humanitarian actor. (Barnett 2009: 640-2) Beyond size, they also had an operational legitimacy, and their highly qualified staff- and active use of specialists- made them respected actors on the ground (see eg. ODI 1996: 39,103). CARE had a background which made them especially well equipped for major logistical operations and the technical aspects of efficient aid delivery. In the words of Barnett (2009: 641) "they prided themselves on their managerial expertise."

7.3.2 Care post Rwanda:

Care was as exposed as its' peers to the harsh criticisms presented in JEEAR. CARES first move into the humanitarian governance network was joining SCHR in 1996 (Henry 1999). They entered just in time to be part of SCHR new found focus on rights. From early in the year SCHR had circulated memos with regards to a proposed "set of technical standards in four sectors, based on the rights of those affected" (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 31). This was the first systematic advent of the rights based approach¹². Already in November 1996 CARE, which up to that point had been fairly agnostic with regards to rights, start an internal examination of the relationship between their activities and human rights. The interesting aspect of this is that CARE did so in full understanding of the consequences it would have for their relationship with the US-government. (Barnett 2009: 643) Just as MSF had to avoid formal standards to be free to act politically, CARE needed the freedom to act as the food aid representative of the US-government. To be bound by the rights-based approach and set standards- was to potentially break the very lucrative tie to the United States.

12 The first beginnings of the rightst based approache within a humanitarian governance context. More broadly varieties of rights based approaches have existed since the 1950's. For a full discussion see Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004.

Now Barnett (Barnett 2009: 654) finds CARE to be a deviant case with regards to his evolutionary model for humanitarian agencies; proving that "aid agencies can walk away from the hand that feeds them if they are convinced that their feeding is taking food out of the mouths of the needy." He accredits CARE's move towards a rights based approach to historical happen-stance: the combination of an internal discussion, "considerable reflections regarding the shortcomings of the field" and the rise of a new president of CARE. The importance of Peter Bell's presidency in CARE is that he was a former chair of what would later become the Human Rights Watch. (Barnett 2009: 642) However, the reflections on the short-coming in the field had begun before Bell's presidency began in 1995. Already from April to July in 1994- the broad-based discussions on failures in Rwanda had begun among actors in the humanitarian field (Buchanan-Smith 2003). There is a reason Bell was elected President- and they need not be irrational or tied to a higher ethic.


Prior to Rwanda CARE had been the very definition of a Wilsonian humanitarian organisation. They had a broad technical expertise, but for the Dunantist organisations they could not be viewed as a legitimate actor- not while being so closely tied to American foreign policy. The advent of humanitarian governance presented a unique opportunity for CARE, whose technical and managerial expertise could potentially provide an opportunity to influence the sector as a whole. If they were to have any chance in achieving this, outside a purely American context, they needed to cut the tie to the US-government. They needed to find an independent principled formulation that could increase the value of their technical abilities. The chair of CARE, Lincoln C. Chen, summarised their position at the time that Bell took over the presidency:

When Peter Bell joined CARE as president and CEO in 1995, he took the helm of an organization with 50 years' experience relieving suffering around the world. We excelled at managing complex logistical systems during emergencies and at meeting the dire needs of people in extremely poor communities. Yet, by the time of Peter's arrival, it had become increasingly clear that we, like other international development agencies, needed to do more. We needed to transform ourselves into positive forces for sustainable change in an ever more complex

world. (Chen 2006: 1)

By turning to a rights based approach, CARE made themselves compatible with Dunantist and Solidarists, with the notable exception of MSF and some other the francophone NGOs. Their managerial and technical expertise became an important power-resource when establishing joint standards and practices. The governing initiatives produced became easy practices for CARE to adapt- and further increased their legitimacy in the humanitarian field.

After joining SCHR in 1996, CARE's engagement in the humanitarian governance network took off. They joined People in Aid at the same time as they started participation in the development of the Sphere project later in 1996. They were among the first members of ALNAP which was established in 1997 (Stein 2009: 152). CARE also initiated the Emergency Response Capacity Building Project (ECBP), through which six of the largest humanitarian INGOs sought to collaborate to improve their response time. When the Humanitarian Accountability Project was established in 2003, CARE was among the few American organisations who let HAP conduct a base-line analysis of their organisation (see HAP 2012).



Illustrasjon 9: CARE ego-network

In initiating the ECBP, CARE made use of their brokerage position. Being the “quintessential Wilsonian” (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 33) organisation gave them legitimacy vis-a-vis the American NGOs, while their new rights-based approach and technical acumen gave them legitimacy vis-a-vis the Europeans.

The membership in HAP is a bit more confusing, as the top to bottom accountability scheme offered by HAP is not entirely well suited for CARE's practices. CARE's accountability practice is rights based and promotes minimum standards and frameworks, but CARE does not have a tradition for beneficiary accountability. The idea of beneficiary accountability breaks with the Wilsonian idea of humanitarianism as a non-problematic doing of good deeds. HAP's rather strict definitions of what constitutes accountability has therefore been received with ambivalence from several Wilsonian NGOs. While some “argue that they fear adding a new, cumbersome layer of bureaucracy to already overstretched field offices. Others admit that the HAP raises the spectre of potential litigation- that particularly American scourge.” (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 33) While the results of the base-line analysis is confidential (see HAP 2011: 9) it is likely that CARE would have fallen somewhat short of the mark. This explains why they are not certified members of HAP- but does not explain why they

remain paying members. It seems that CARE pursues an active policy of participation, even when initiatives fall outside their comfort zones. Unlike MSF, which feared the impact minimum standards- and therefore withdrew to a voluntary exile.

7.4 OFADEC: Punching above one's weight

7.4.1 OFADEC's initial power resources

Office Africain pour le Developpement et la Cooperation (OFADEC) was established in 1976 as a local initiative responding to a severe drought situation. The first project was a small one- focusing on one small village on the banks of the Gambia river. After an initial success they secured external funding from the US organisation UMCOR, the humanitarian branch of the Methodist Church (UMCOR 2012). This increased funding allowed them to expand their activities into developing irrigation systems. By the end of the program they had produced irrigation systems in 20 villages, impacting the lives of approximately 2000 people. (OFADEC 2012) Compared to the large humanitarian enterprises conducted by the major transnational NGOs, this is relatively small scale. In the context of transnational humanitarian governance they were a small national NGO operating in Senegal.

The Senegal-Mauritania Border conflict of 1989-1991 changed this situation. The armed conflict between the two states was of a limited nature, but the ethnic conflict between the Moors and the black Africans in the area led to the forced exodus of 70 000 southern Mauritians into Senegal. This emergency situation prompted the involvement of the UNHCR. While OFADEC was initially only involved in food distribution for the UNHCR, they gradually proved the advantages of their local knowledge- and eventually became a full implementing partner. Towards the end of 1992 they had effectively taken over the whole operative aspect of UNHCR engagement with Mauritanian refugees. (Fresia 2009: 285-9)

While not a very big humanitarian organisation, OFADEC still had legitimacy as an African national NGO which had not only successfully implemented projects to improve living conditions in Senegal, they had also proved themselves a very

successful implementing partner for the UN. This is one of those instances where size does not really matter- they were legitimate because they operated complex humanitarian programs and mastered the strict reporting criteria for implementing partners of the UN.

7.4.2 OFADEC post Rwanda

The events in Rwanda bore no direct relevance for OFADEC. They had not been present and held no responsibility for the humanitarian failures in Rwanda. Yet JEEAR would still have an impact on the future of OFADEC. JEEAR found a shocking lack of understanding for local culture and structures among the aid-workers. Lack of understanding and cultural acumen often lead to difficult and at times dangerous situations. The lack of language competency outside of French, meant that several of the more vulnerable members of the refugee populations were unable to communicate their concern- effectively maintaining a hierarchy where the educated French speaking elite dominated the the vulnerable Kinyarwanda speakers.(see ODI 1996: 175-78) How was the international humanitarian community to overcome these challenges? While not part of the JEEAR recommendations, it became clear that local partnerships were needed. Collaboration with local NGOs and civil society could provide the international humanitarians with the local insight they needed. An additional advantage would be that the local emergency capacity would be improved. (see eg. Smilie 2001; Byombuka 2004) However, partnerships of this nature can be precarious- the occasional use of implementing partners in Rwanda had resulted in money lost -or at least not accurately accounted for (DeWaal 1997: 195-7). For international humanitarian organisations it is vital that local partners are able to follow the accountability standards they use- so that the international organisations themselves will be able to accurately report how they have used the funds to their donors.

This development created a niche for OFADEC. They were a well respected implementing partner of UNHCR- and had learned to adapt to international forms of financial reporting. They were professional, yet small, and they spoke the language of


the international humanitarians. (Fresia 2009) In short, they were the perfect representatives of local implementing partners that the humanitarian governance network needed. The many small scale local civil society organisations that could potentially be a valuable asset in international humanitarian responses, naturally lack a common voice. This gave OFADEC a remarkable power advantage in the humanitarian governance network. Being a prime example of a small, yet highly legitimate, local actor, put them in a position where they could speak on behalf of those the global humanitarians wanted to reach.

OFADEC became an active member of ICVA- eventually leading to them representing ICVA on the board of the Sphere-project. OFADEC was active in HAP- in a period even holding a position on the board. (SPHERE 2012) They became the first organisation to ever meet the certification criteria for HAP¹³ - a mark of quality they still only share with twelve other organisations (HAP 2012). They even gained impasse to the Active Learning Network for Accountability Practices (ALNAP), which has been accused of being an elite instrument of only the most important humanitarian organisations and donors (see Stein 2009). They were among the original signatories of the Principles of Partnership- and represented themselves in the forum- as an equal alongside ICVA. At the moment OFADEC has recently run two types of projects, a scholarship project funded by UNHCR in Dakar, and assisting programs for UNHCR's repatriation of Mauritanian refugees. For a humanitarian organisation with such limited funds- very few operative programs, and none outside of Senegal,¹⁴ the organisation has had a remarkable influence on global humanitarian governance. To make a comparison, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) is operative in 42 countries and has an annual budget of well over 300 million US dollars (International Rescue Committee 2010: 4). IRC use the Sphere-project standards in their work, accepting their guidance as legitimate with regards to minimum standards (Rupp 2005). Yet IRC does not have a board member in the Sphere-project, while OFADEC does. Comparing the Ego-networks of these two organisations below makes this point clear. OFADEC with its budget measured in thousands of Franc is as well


13 Authors telephone interview with Mr Ndiaye (CEO of OFADEC) 18.05.2012

14 Authors telephone interview with Mr Ndiaye (CEO of OFADEC) 18.05.2012

represented- and in more exclusive forums- than the giant IRC.



Illustrasjon 10: IRC ego-network



Illustrasjon 11: OFADEC ego-network

IRC is a member of all three major consortia VOICE, InterAction, and ICVA. They participated in the Principles of Partnership, and while not certified, are still members of HAP. That is to say, it seems clear that IRC wishes to have influence over the humanitarian governance network. OFADEC's relative success compared to the giant IRC seems to support the claim that legitimacy is better measure of importance than available funds.

Another key question then becomes, what is in it for OFADEC? With very limited operational capacity, why is advantageous for them to influence global humanitarian governance? The short answer is: it is not. OFADEC does not need to influence global humanitarian governance to increase the legitimacy of their own programs. In terms of transnational humanitarianism, they are not even a relevant actor. However, as they have such small programs it is no issue for them to adapt their practices to conform to international governance initiatives. A case in point is OFADEC's relationship to HAP. In 2009, HAP conducted an evaluation of OFADEC's accountability practices. The findings were presented in a public case study which concluded that "This is accountability at its best!" (Haw 2010: 3) For IRC, implementing the HAP standards would probably entail a vast institutional reform, but with only two programs it becomes significantly easier for OFADEC. Being presented by HAP as a prime example of their standards in practice increases OFADEC's legitimacy in itself, while the cost in adapting programs is relatively low. In short, while the large organisations

might need to use their influence to increase the legitimacy of their *modi operandi*, OFADEC needs the legitimacy of the governance initiatives and can adapt their *modus operandi* to achieve this goal.

The reason OFADEC needs the legitimacy becomes apparent when evaluating their current operational context. Their original *raison d'être* was improving agricultural efficiency in Senegal. While the country is still among the less developed states (see UNDP 2012), OFADEC's involvement with UNHCR has moved them from development towards a more relief oriented practice. They have been engaged in an education program in Dakar and repatriation projects in the north, both of which have been UNHCR financed. However, the humanitarian situation on the Mauritanian border is resolved- UNHCR has completed their repatriation mission in Senegal (see UNHCR 2012). With UNHCR terminating the major operative programs in Senegal, OFADEC is left without any available programs. Currently OFADEC operates as an unofficial focal point for 36 national NGOs in the west African region. They have been given projects by the UNHCR to develop workshops on efficient partnerships between UNHCR and their other local operative partners. Mr. Ndiaye, CEO of OFADEC, explained their new area of activity as follows: "We work with UNHCR to improve dialogue between them and implementing partners. Sometimes there are frustrations on both sides: so you need dialogue. We work on organising workshops to improve this relations."¹⁵ More recently these workshops have been expanded to cover UNHCR's East Africa partners as well. It seems OFADEC has found a way to capitalise on their niche position in the humanitarian governance network. They were given legitimacy as brokers between the large- and primarily Western- humanitarian enterprise, and the local partners they were committed to collaborate with. This position has translated into tangible assets for OFADEC, which will now be able to continue functioning as an agency specialised in that capacity.

7.5 Summary discussion

The integrative agency model- derived from DiMaggio and Powell's(1983) concept of isomorphic change seems a good fit. OCHA, being one of a kind, is unable to establish

¹⁵ Authors telephone interview with Mr Ndiaye (CEO of OFADEC) 18.05.2012

support via proficiency in the field. Even though they are a UN-agency they have no natural supporters in the network. This spurred them to a strategic usage of relational power- effectively attempting to trade their unique legitimacy for support from actors with more field credibility. MSF, whose legitimacy is based on independence, opposed standardisation attempts in the network. Fearing that standards and rules would decrease the legitimacy of their sporadic breed of morality- they actively opposed the process in the network. They used their relational power, and their isomorphic leadership, in influencing other French NGOs to support them. Their attempted use of the brokerage role granted them by the French NGOs to force the sphere-project on a different path failed. In part because they did not have sufficient brokerage power. The organisations willing to follow them were too few and too small to be of major consequence. CARE too use their available power resources to maximise the legitimacy of their *modus operandi*. They were more successful in influencing the governance network to suite their purpose, partially because of their greater brokerage, and partially as they followed a policy of participation and partial adaptation. They were able to use their relational power because they adapted to the expectations of more actors when they adopted the rights-based-approach. While CARE succeeded and MSF did not, their actions were motivated by the same desire and their strategies were both based on using relational power. Finally OFADEC illustrates the point of view of those following the isomorphic leaders. OFADEC did not need to influence the network- but the legitimacy granted them by broad participation proved vital for their continued survival. This again shows that funding becomes secondary to legitimacy- a highly legitimate actor will be funded- whereas a actor with high funding need not necessarily get the legitimacy or power necessary to influence humanitarian governance.

What of the operative definition of power? Is relational power the primary power-resource in humanitarian governance and can it be operationalised as through membership? The Case of OCHA demonstrates that shared membership certainly does not entail shared interests. The other UN-agencies participated in IASC, but apparently not out of a desire to support OCHA's claim to leadership over the sector. However,

OCHAs weak connection to the rest of the humanitarian governance network was, in part, reflected in their low degree of participation. Regardless of this, they were able to solicit support from well connected nodes- by capitalising on their legitimacy as a UN-mandated coordinator. This legitimacy is one of the aspects that cannot be captured by SNA. The same was evident in the case of MSF, where their ties to other francophone NGO's was not clearly represented in joint memberships. MSF's isomorphic leadership was not reflected in membership. Had COMPAS Qualité evolved into a sustainable competitor of the Sphere-standards, this would not have been the case. MSF's isomorphic leadership could then probably have been reflected in their members. However, that remains besides the point. The key observation is that while membership can be an indicator of relational power, the informal aspect of isomorphic leadership is not captured in the operative definitions of relational power through membership. The same can be observed in the CARE case. While clearly an important broker between the European and American humanitarian traditions, this is not reflected in membership. While they are members of InterAction, the SNA formalisation does not show how important they are within InterAction. Other organisations, such as IRC, are members of both VOICE and InterAction, and will therefore be portrayed as more important brokers between the Europeans and Americans. Finally, the case of OFADEC shows that membership need not necessarily be used as a means of influencing humanitarian governance. While they might use membership to promote their legitimacy, this is done by adapting to standards rather than adapting the standards to suit themselves. While this demonstrates that legitimacy is important, it warrants a nuanced view on membership and power. While OFADEC holds an influential position in the network, it is not in their interests to use that power to shape humanitarian governance. It is therefore unclear whether they can be said to have power over humanitarian governance, or if it is better to say that humanitarian governing mechanisms have power over them.

I find the conditions specified in hypothesis 4-7 adequately met. While some caveats are necessary with regards to the concrete operationalisations and the limits of the data, the case discussions none the less demonstrate the applicability of the integrative

model. While the strict operationalisations should be re-evaluated with regards to validity- the underlying concepts do show their usefulness in analysing humanitarian governance and power.

7.6 Additional Observations

The selected cases are only four of the 656 organisations in the analysis. While chosen on the basis of most different- such a small case selection does not warrant a generalisation to the whole population. The rest of the network has also been investigated- and here I wish to summarise some key observations with regards to the different components of relational power.

7.6.1 Participation

The humanitarian governance network exists in what I have described as a quasi-anarchy. As a result there are several ways in which actors can seek to maximise their influence by strategic positioning within the network. Local offices provide one such route. Consider the major NGO-consortia represented in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). By hierarchical logic, InterAction should represent the US-based NGOs, while ICVA- as an international consortia- should represent the rest. In theory the entire humanitarian community could be represented by one of these in the IASC. In reality this is not how these consortia function. Membership is naturally quite open, even the regional criteria are quite loose, making it easy to manipulate the representation scheme. The International Medical Corps is one example among many: The organisation has offices in both the UK and the US and has registered the UK office as a UK charity with a separate board. However, they share the same CEO and publish a joint Annual Report (cf. Mercy Corps UK 2012; Mercy Corps USA 2012). Legally, they might be seen as separate organisations- in reality the UK office might best be described as a local branch. Mercy Corps is a member of all three consortia, effectively giving them three routes to IASC. Similar constellations can be found for organisations such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the International Medical Corps (IMC) and the Medical Relief International (MERLIN). In other words, there seems to be some indication of participation maximising strategies- at least

among some actors.

An interesting side note is that organisations such as CARE, Oxfam, MSF, CARITAS, and Save the Children, who are all members of SCHR, do not follow this pattern of maximising representation. Which is interesting, as their corporate governance structure provides more independence to the national offices than in the case of Mercy Corps (cf. CARE International 2012; Caritas Internationalis 2012; MSF 2012; Save the Children 2012). This would again seem to point to qualitative differences between governance mechanisms. Membership in SCHR, granting almost direct access to IASC, makes additional representation superfluous.

7.6.2 Brokerage

Brokerage is the power gained by holding a position between two cliques of actors. Another element of brokerage is representation. That is- the ability to claim representation of actors otherwise unconnected to the network. Formally, in SNA, these are two components of the same phenomena. With regards to representation, the religious humanitarian organisations present a challenge. While the humanitarian governance network primarily consists of humanitarian organisations, the challenge for the Christian organisations is also to gain the support of churches and ecumenical societies. The affiliations of individual churches have not been included in this analysis, but with regards to brokerage- this aspect warrants some further discussion.

The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is an interesting example, it is a governance mechanism rather than an organisation- in that it seeks to govern the activities of several different actors. However, the actors are churches, not organisations, so they are not included in the analysis. The LWF is a global communion of Christian churches in the Lutheran tradition. Founded in 1947 in Lund, Sweden, the LWF now has 145 member churches in 79 countries all over the world. Representing some 70 million Christians- and thereby becoming the conductor of substantial humanitarian funds. Their ambition is to establish a communion of churches that will promote accountable and coordinated humanitarian relief. (LWF 2012)

There is, however, also a Lutheran World Relief (LWR). LWR has the same global ambition as LWF, but with less focus on accountability and coordination and a greater focus on the religious message. Their mission statement gives a fair synopsis:

“Affirming God’s love for all people, we work with Lutherans and partners around the world to end poverty, injustice and human suffering”(LWR 2012). These two initiatives are not unaware of each other, as they share a membership in the ACT Alliance. Their failure to collaborate into one single Lutheran representative would seem to be best explained by the Dunantist / Wilsonian divide- as it manifests in a religious setting. LWR is based in the US while LWF originated in Sweden. LWF has extended their activities into the North-American continent, but note that they have limited success. “In North America 'communion' is not a concept that is easily understood.” They do however hope that as “the member churches in North America grow in their understanding they [will recognize that] partnerships, responsibilities and accountability [...] calls them to.” (LWF 2012) While LWR is only members of the Act-alliance and Interaction, LWF has secured membership in SCHR and the Sphere-board, in addition to their membership in ICVA and HAP. It would seem that in terms of influence, LWR would profit from an inclusion in LWF. However, the disagreement with regards to the extent of “communion” as governance, seems to have been too severe.

The analytical point of this discussion is to demonstrate that while brokerage and reach are mutually constituting, divergent interests with regards to divergent forms of legitimacy, can hamper an organisations ability to establish brokerage. Consider the tripartite consortia represented in IASC as an additional example. ICVA has the ambition of representing all the worlds humanitarian NGOs, but organisations still choose to be affiliated with VOICE and InterAction instead. While several organisations hold double or even triple memberships- ICVA's inability to establish an effective global brokerage would seem to indicate that diverging interests can manifest in memberships.

7.6.3 Reach

With regards to reach, the Humanitarian Forum (HF) presents an interesting case. They are established as a governing mechanisms with the stated purpose of acting as brokers between the Western and Islamic relief agencies (Humanitarian Forum 2006). However, to become a broker they must first extend their reach. To accomplish this goal they set up a main branch office in the UK, and from there open national forums in Islamic countries. While this provides contact with Islamic relief agencies, they still need to get hooked into the broader humanitarian network in order to function as brokers. Rather than joining ICVA or VOICE- they just establish a formal connection to the Red Cross UK, Oxfam International and Mercy Corps. In the words of the their director, Shaw-Hamilton (2012) this was to make use of "their perspectives, legitimacy and connections". As noted in the discussion above of SCHR's role vis-a-vis OCHA, it seems that the steering committee of the HF functions in the same way as SCHR does for OCHA. While one is a UN mandated coordinator of all things humanitarian, the other is a relative small civil society initiative from the UK. However, when faced with the challenge of governing the humanitarian field, both actors need to take in use the same relational power strategies. A second key observation is that brokerage can breed more brokerage. Oxfam, Mercy Corps and the Red Cross are already major actors in the network- their position makes them attractive members of governance mechanisms that need to extend their reach. That is, organisations such as Oxfam, Mercy Corps, and the Red Cross, have their reach extended partly as consequence of their already high reach.

8 Analysis Part- 3

How are the core components of relational power distributed among the actors in the humanitarian governance network? Below I present the results of each analysis and discuss the implications of the findings. The discussion above has been a looser discussion of the construct of relational power in humanitarian governance. The

discussion below presents the results of the operative measure of these ideas. When clarified from a construct to a measurement, the ideas of the construct were formalised and applied to a dataset. It is therefore important to consider the validity of these in relation to the findings.

8.1 Participation

The most active organisations in the humanitarian governance network are shown below in table 5. This is actually nothing more than a sum of the memberships each organisation holds, nominalised to the right. CARE international tops the list with nine memberships, but the other large scale humanitarian organisations are all listed among the top five placements. A notable exception is MSF, but this is natural- as they have had a good reason to withdraw from humanitarian governance. All measures calculated by UCINET (Borgatti, Everett et al. 2002) see Appendix 1.

Rank	Organisation (s)	Outwards Degree	Nominal* Outward
1	<i>Care International</i>	9	0.563
2	<i>World Vision</i>	8	0.500
3	<i>International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, Oxfam International</i>	7	0.438
4	<i>Islamic Relief World Wide, Concern Worldwide, ActionAid International, Lutheran World Federation, International Federation of the Red Cross, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council</i>	6	0.375
5	<i>Christian Aid, OFADEC, Medical Relief International, Danish Refugee Council, International Committee of the Red Cross</i>	5	0.313
* Note that the nominal degree is calculated on the 2-mode dataset separating first and second mode units. See Appendix A			

Tabell 5: Degree Centrality of Organisations

What the table above does not depict is the organisations direct contact with others via common forums. As shown in table 6 below, there are large differences in the number

of organisations that are members of each governing mechanism. InterAction, the US NGO consortium, tops the list with 184 member organisations. The General Humanitarian Platform becomes meagre in comparison, having only four members. These calculations are conducted on the first mode of the 2-mode dataset, so relations between the governing mechanisms have been excluded. None the less, it would be interesting to see how many organisations each ego is in contact with via each of the major forums. How broad an ego network do the organisations actually have?

Rank	Governing Mechanism (s)	In Degree	Nominal In
1	InterAction	184	.287
2	People in Aid	173	.270
3	Act-alliance	120	.188
4	VOICE	82	.128
5	ACFID	74	.116
6	ICVA	66	.103
7	HAP	64	.100
8	ALNAP, Principles of Partnership	31	.048
9	Aktion Hilft	21	.033
10	IASC	15	.023
11	SPHERE	13	.020
12	Humanitarian Forum	12	.019
13	SCHR	9	.014
14	ECBP	5	.008
15	GHP	4	.006

NB: The membership in-degree is measured in the first mode of the 2-mode network- relations between governing mechanisms are therefore not represented (ie: IASC has four more members, Voice InterAction, ICVA and SCHR- not represented in calculation)

Tabell 6: Degree Centrality of Governing Mechanisms

To measure this aspect of degree centrality, the 2-mode dataset was recomputed into an affiliations Dataset (see Appendix A). Affiliations degree centrality is based on a dataset where organisations who are both member of the same governing mechanism are registered by a direct tie. The affiliated degree centrality gives a measure of how many other organisations each ego interacts with *via* the governing mechanisms.

While CARE International topped the list for degree centrality, the International Rescue Committee, International Medical Corps, Concern Worldwide, and ActionAid, all have a broader ego-network in terms of affiliations. Theoretically, this means that they have direct contact with more humanitarian actors- and therefore have the opportunity to influence more organisations. However it is not necessarily clear that this translates into a relational power advantage. The high affiliations are partially a consequence of high participation in governing mechanisms (see table 6 above), but also a consequence of a broad presence in the regional consortia. All three of the top ranking organisations in the affiliations table 7 below, share the quality that they are members of all three major consortia, ICVA, VOICE and InterAction. Their high affiliations degree is therefore caused by the high number of organisations that are exclusively members of one of these. This does give them an advantage in terms of being represented in more fora, but the high number of members in the consortia also imply that the organisations ability to influence joint policy is proportionately reduced. That is, because there are many members, and because the consortia are built on democratic principles, the relative influence of member votes is low. Several of these organisations are also members of People in Aid. As has been discussed this organisation is somewhere between a governing mechanism and a service provider- it is dubious that organisation will exert power over the humanitarian field by implementing People in Aid's human resource policies.

Rank	Organisation (s)	Outwards Degree	Nominal Outward
1	<i>International Resue Comittee</i>	642	12.207
2	<i>International Medical Corps</i>	606	11.854
3	<i>Concern Worldwide, ActionAid International</i>	594	11.620
4	<i>CARE International</i>	567	11.092
5	<i>Medical Relief International</i>	564	11.033
6	<i>Islamic Relief Worldwide</i>	530	10.368
7	<i>Mercy Corps</i>	516	10.094
8	<i>HelpAge International</i>	483	9.448
9	<i>Christian Aid</i>	465	9.096
10	<i>Habitat for Humanity</i>	448	8.764

Tabell 7: Affiliations Degree Centrality

Another organisation which is a surprise inclusion among the top ten organisations in table 7. is Habitat for Humanity. While it could be argued that they are a humanitarian organisation specialised in shelter, their programs are not exclusive to emergency situations. The major questions of accountability, minimum standards, and response coordination, are not that relevant for Habitat. Their modus operandi is to help individuals and communities construct housing- partially based on funding help and partially based on voluntary action. This response speciality is more relevant for the time "long after humanitarian aid organizations have completed their relief work" (Habitat for Humanity 2012). They are in other words an organisation on the fringe of what constitutes a humanitarian organisation. So why do they have so many affiliations in the humanitarian governance network? As it turns out, this is a consequence of a co-occurrence of several fringe governance mechanisms. Habitat are a big organisation in Australia (see Habitat for Humanity 2012), so they are naturally members of ACFID. As the organisation is originally American, they are also members of InterAction. They do have employees working in difficult situations, so membership in People in Aid comes natural. Finally, they have a successful German office, which has given them membership in Aktion Hilft. While all these governing mechanisms are relevant actors in humanitarian governance (see Chapter 4. Data), not all their members need to have an interest in humanitarian governance. To phrase it in

another way, there are other good reasons to join these organisations than a desire to influence humanitarian governance.

So while the degree centrality in Table 6 provides an overview of how active organisations are in the governance network, it doesn't provide any means of evaluating the relative significance of each governing mechanism. The number of organisations involved in each governing mechanism also provides an unsatisfactory answer to this question, as membership denotes a different phenomena in the different governing mechanisms. Affiliations does not ease this issue, as was seen in the case of Habitat for Humanity, as fringe organisations are valued as highly in the network as clear-cut humanitarian organisations.

8.2 Brokerage

Brokerage is the ability to confer governance initiatives from one actor to another. Operationalised in this analysis to placement on the shortest geodesic path between two nodes. The assumed relational power advantaged gained by brokerage, is that brokers are in a better negotiating position as they have control over the spread of a governance initiative to other actors. Brokerage can manifest in two different ways- organisation to network and organisation to organisation. The latter of theses is represented as affiliation betweenness in the table 8 below. While the former, network brokerage, is represented in the Scale-free betweenness. All measures calculated by UCINET(Borgatti, Everett et al. 2002).

Rank	Scale-free Betweenness		Affiliations Betweenness	
	nBetween n*	Organisation(s)	nBetween n	Organisation(s)
1	2.482	<i>CARE International</i>	3.291	<i>Islamic Relief Worldwide</i>
2	2.194	<i>Islamic Relief</i>	2.942	<i>Habitat for Humanity</i>
3	2.177	<i>Habitat for Humanity</i>	2.777	<i>Act for Peace</i>
4	1.953	<i>ActionAid International</i>	2.630	<i>Christian Aid/Church World Service</i>
5	1.798	<i>Act for Peace</i>	2.423	<i>Marie Stopes International</i>
6	1.507	<i>UnitingWorld</i>	2.378	<i>Christian Aid</i>
7	1.372	<i>Mercy Corps</i>	2.297	<i>Int. Orthodox Christian Charities</i>
8	1.317	<i>Oxfam International</i>	2.225	<i>Uniting World</i>
9	1.293	<i>CBM Australia</i>	2.203	<i>Mercy Corps</i>
10	1.119	<i>World Vision</i>	2.182	<i>International Rescue Committee</i>
*As Brokerage is of the same consequence, regardless of whether the node is an organisation or a governing mechanism, the Scale-free network is nominalised by both first and second mode nodes.				

Tabell 8: Betweenness Centrality

It is unsurprising that CARE tops the list once again. As was extensively discussed in the case study above (see Analysis Part 2), they adapted to the network in a way that placed them in a brokerage position between the Wilsonian and Dunantist, or perhaps rather the American and European, humanitarian traditions. Likewise, Oxfam's inclusion among the top ten can be explained by a similar phenomena. They are an organisation with solid European traditions. Conceived in the academic circles of Oxford University- the organisation has later spread to several European countries: fronting the Dunantist values of independence and impartiality. (see Oxfam International 2012) They have now opened offices in the US, and collaborate closely with CARE through the ECB project. If CARE is the American bridge to Europe, Oxfam can be seen as the European bridge to America.

The high ranking of Islamic Relief also seems intuitive. Islamic Relief is a British organisation, with headquarters in London. It has offices in the US and in Germany, granting it membership in InterAction, VOICE and Aktion Hilft. (Islamic Relief Worldwide 2012) They are well placed in the central governance network-

participating in HAP, and with Aktion Hilft as connection point to the Sphere project. At the same time they are a member of Humanitarian Forum, and among the very few Islamic organisations in the network. In other words, it seems natural to view Islamic Relief as a key broker between the Western humanitarian network and the newer Islamic humanitarian organisations (see Macrae and Harmer 2003: 44-6). However, a just as likely explanation of their high betweenness degree is their joint membership in InterAction, VOICE and People in Aid. When considering the additional network brokerage gained by membership in Aktion Hilft, which includes several nodes otherwise weakly linked to the network, it seems more likely that Islamic Relief are ranked high in brokerage because of their membership in large governing mechanisms with weakly connected nodes. This suspicion is increased by their position as the highest ranking on affiliations brokerage. There are simply too few Islamic humanitarian organisations in the network for it to impact this strongly.

The continued dominant presence of organisations with large branches in Australia is also a source of concern. As was noted during data sampling, the Australian NGO consortium ACFID was a borderline inclusion. While some of its' members are clearly humanitarian, several others are better described as development agencies. The high brokerage of CBM Australia, UnitingWorld, Habitat for Humanity, and Marie Stopes seems to indicate that the betweenness results have been skewed in favour of ACFID members. It is natural that several members in ACFID will be poorly connected to the humanitarian governance network, as most of them are primarily development organisations. However, in the SNA analysis the nodes are given equal weight- and Australian humanitarian NGOs become brokers between the Australian development organisations and the rest of the humanitarian network. The dominance of Australian NGOs in the betweenness measure is in other words an automorphism of the inclusion of ACFID in the dataset.

While the idea of brokerage seemed relevant in the earlier discussion, it is not completely clear that the idea is adequately captured by the mathematical operationalisation. This will be further discussed under the validity chapter.

8.3 Reach

Reach is the extent to which an actor can reach the entire network- corrected for the power subtracted by the brokers. In terms of relational power, degree is that idea that once you influence a certain number of actors in the ego-network, they in turn can influence those in their ego-networks. Table 9. below shows the nominalised reach of the organisations in terms of scale-free and 2-mode affiliations (see Method Chapter). All calculations conducted in UCINET (Borgatti, Everett et al. 2002) see Appendix 1.

Rank	Scale-free Reach		Affiliations Reach	
	nBetween*	Organisation(s)	nBetween	Organisation(s)
1	.462	<i>CARE International, ActionAid International</i>	.860	<i>International Rescue Committee</i>
3	.459	<i>International Medical Corps</i>	.857	<i>International Medical Corps</i>
4	.458	<i>International Rescue Committee</i>	.856	<i>Concern Worldwide, ActionAid International</i>
5	.456	<i>Concern Worldwide</i>	.844	<i>Medical Relief International</i>
6	.451	<i>Medical Relief International</i>	.840	<i>Islamic Relief Worldwide</i>
7	.449	<i>Mercy Corps</i>	.832	<i>Mercy Corps</i>
8	.446	<i>Islamic Relief Worldwide</i>	.831	<i>CARE International</i>
9	.440	<i>HelpAge International</i>	.820	<i>Habitat for Humanity</i>
10	.431	<i>ICCO</i>	.814	<i>HelpAge International</i>
*As Reach is of the same consequence, regardless of whether the node is an organisation or a governing mechanism, the Scale-free network is nominalised by both first and second mode nodes.				

Tabell 9: Reach Centrality Organisations

Again the dominance of CARE is apparent. Their placement in the network allows for an efficient communication with a large part of the actors involved in humanitarian governance. While the Australian organisations were important with regards to brokerage, they do not dominate as clearly in terms of reach. Naturally being placed among central actors in the network is a greater advantage than having easy access to relatively isolated nodes. Again International Medical Corps and the International

Rescue Committee do well. The strategy of having membership in several major NGO consortia seems to pay off. The absence of Oxfam, indeed the absence of any European NGO outside of Islamic Relief and HelpAge,¹⁶ is a bit strange. Why do the Europeans have such a poor reach relative to the Americans? A part of the answer is obviously that VOICE has 82 members to InterActions 184. As a consequence, American NGOs with a single membership in a consortia reach 182 actor by the second extension, while the equivalent Europeans reach only 82. While partially explainable, this is not necessarily an automorphism- and can seem to indicate a relative dominance of American humanitarian organisations over European. The reach measure should partially compensate the dominance in the first degree as the measure extends. Disregarding the influence of a governing mechanism¹⁷, it seems that the American NGOs, despite their scepticism to litigations (see Macrae and Harmer 2003: 33) might be more central in the humanitarian governance network than their European counterparts. A part of the explanation for this can also be InterActions presence in the IASC and the absence of VOICE.

The Table 10 below shows the reach centrality of the governing mechanisms. Both InterAction and People in Aid also had the top positions in the inn-degree centrality table, however, it is interesting to note that ICVA has higher ranking than the Act-Alliance in terms of reach. The Act-Alliance has almost twice as many direct members as ICVA, but it is clear that the ICVA members are much better placed within the network. The principles of partnership also have a much higher reach centrality than one would expect. It would seem that the choice of participants for the original PoP meeting was a good one, engaging organisations with a diverging patterns of membership. Another interesting observation is that individual humanitarian organisations can have a greater reach than governing mechanisms. CARE

16 HelpAge is an interesting case. They characterise themselves as a network rather than an organisation, but are organised as a corporate organisations with national NGOs as implementing partners. The headquarters are in London, but the organisation evolved simultaneously in Canada, UK, Kenya, India, and Colombia. (See HelpAge 2012)

17 The Europeans are well represented in SPHERE- one of the qualitatively most influential governing mechanisms, as well as in HAP- and to a certain extent ALNAP.

International has a reach centrality of .462 to ALNAPs .443.¹⁸ ALNAP has 31 members, but the size of the ego-network falls compared to CARE's extended contacts.

Rank	nReach	Governance-mechanism
1	0.554	<i>InterAction</i>
2	0.541	<i>People in Aid</i>
3	0.518	<i>ICVA</i>
4	0.493	<i>Act-Alliance</i>
5	0.482	<i>Principles of Partnership</i>
6	0.475	<i>HAP</i>
7	0.466	<i>VOICE</i>
8	0.461	<i>SPHERE</i>
9	0.443	<i>ALNAP</i>
10	0.429	<i>ACFID</i>
11	0.423	<i>General Humanitarian Platform</i>
12	0.398	<i>IASC</i>
13	0.388	<i>SCHR</i>
14	0.361	<i>Aktion Hilft</i>
15	0.355	<i>Humanitarian Forum</i>
16	0.326	<i>ECBP</i>
*This calculation was done on the scale-free network under the assumption that reach carries equal substantive meaning for both 1-mode and 2-mode actors.		

Tabell 10: Reach Centrality Governance Mechanisms

Again the idea of reach, which seemed relevant in the earlier discussion, might not be adequately captured by the mathematical operationalisation. The inherent short-comings of SNA as a method become evident in the result- and choices in data sampling clearly have a significant impact on the measures.

8.4 Answering the research question

I asked the question: *What actors have power and influence over the political processes aimed at producing humanitarian governance?* The ambition of the discussion above was to provide a clear cut answer. However, the shortcomings of the data necessitate certain caveats:

¹⁸ The analysis of scale-free reach centrality uses the same nominalisation for both modes of data. So the results are comparable between governing mechanisms and humanitarian organisations.

Assuming that the data selected constitutes the entire humanitarian governance network. In which all actors are presumed to be humanitarian organisations- and all are presumed to have equal power and influence prior to their position in the governance network. Further assuming that no other means of exerting power exist, outside the facets of relational power- and no other routes of influence exist outside those delineated by membership. Then the data above would give grounds to conclude that:

- 1) The most active participants in the network, who therefore have the greatest potential to influence humanitarian governance, are: CARE International, World Vision, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, and Oxfam International.
- 2) The actors best positioned as brokers, thereby gaining an advantage in negotiations, are: CARE International, Islamic Relief, Habitat for Humanity, and Action Aid International. Of these, the best positioned to broker between individual organisations are Islamic Relief and Habitat for Humanity.
- 3) The actors with the most effective reach through the humanitarian governance network, thereby allowing them to effectively influence the largest portion of the network, are: CARE International, ActionAid, International Medical Corps, and International Rescue Committee. Of these, the organisations with the greatest ability to reach other individual organisations are International Rescue Committee and International Medical Corps.

9 Discussion of validity

While the research question only dealt with the distribution of power in the process aimed at producing humanitarian governance, the road to answering that question implicated several other theoretical aspects. Some of these are necessary parts of the analysis, and their validity should be discussed on equal footing with the measurements of relational power above. Below I discuss the validity of the findings under the framework of Adcock and Collier's (2001) shared standards of measurement validity between qualitative and quantitative approaches. As has been mentioned, despite its' mathematical aspects social network analysis is best viewed as a qualitative approach.

9.1 Concepts

There were several concepts involved in this analysis. The first was the concept of humanitarian organisations, ideally viewed as a separate from development organisations in that they relieve immediate suffering, rather than long-term injustice. The second concept was the transnational humanitarian anarchy, defined in contrast to the dominant portrayals of anarchy in the IR literature. Transnational anarchy was defined as a more gentle than the Hobbesian state of nature, and less commercially oriented than deMolinari's free-market anarchism. Theoretically, it was seen as better portrayed by Kropotkin's classical description of anarchy as a form of organisation. The third concept was that of the integrative model of humanitarian agency. Humanitarian organisations were presumed to seek legitimacy over funding, and to follow successful leaders in the humanitarian field. This led to the conclusion that power needed to be defined as relational power. All the humanitarian organisations sought to maximise their legitimacy through humanitarian governance, but their ability to do so would be determined by their relations to others in the field.

9.2 Systematised Concept Validity

The concept of humanitarian organisations was systematised to mean an organisation involved in emergency relief in states other than those in which they had their origin. The validity of this systematised concept follow almost directly from the theoretical definition of humanitarianism and can be seen to have face validity. The concept of the transnational humanitarian anarchy was systematised as a large scale network. As Kropotkin (1910) described it “the complex web of voluntary associations would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations” which seems an apt description of a social network. Again I would argue the perceiving the the transnational humanitarian anarchy as a network, has face validity. The integrative model proved a greater challenge in terms of systematisation, but was eventually summarised as organisations seeking legitimacy by maximising the value of their available capital. The choice not to present a complete list of what constitutes relevant capital, weakened the analytical strength of the model. However,

when faced with the broad fauna of humanitarian organisations and their respective sources of legitimacy, this would in retrospect seem a correct choice. Relational power was systematised to mean participation, brokerage, and reach. While these do not follow directly from the concept of relational power, they can be seen as further development of the idea.

9.3 Indicator Validity

Humanitarian organisations were indicated by their participation in humanitarian governing mechanisms. It was presumed that only organisations fitting the description above would find it relevant to participate in the humanitarian governance network. This proved a faulty assumption, as there were several organisations included in the analysis which did not meet the criteria for my systematic concept of humanitarian organisation. The validity of the indicator for humanitarian organisations is therefore partially invalid. However, as has been extensively discussed earlier, the core of the issue of humanitarian governance is the search for a common definition of what humanitarianism is. While it seemed theoretically intuitive to provide a clear distinction between humanitarianism and development aid- the reality is that this boundary is more fluid. Humanitarian organisations conduct development work, and development organisations have a stake in the humanitarian field. The disadvantages of not having the theoretical concept of humanitarianism delineating the network were severe. However, when faced with the reality of the phenomena of humanitarian governance- I do not see that it could have been done in another way. Attempting to filter the 656 organisations based on a qualitative evaluation of the extent to which they conduct emergency relief- would have been even more compromising to the validity of the findings.

The social network of humanitarian governance was indicated by the patterns of membership in transnational governance mechanisms. Relations, or edges, were defined by membership, and actors, or nodes, indicated by organisations being members. The data on the network was gathered by a snow-ball sample. While initially hoping to conduct the sample under strict edge-definitions, it became apparent

that this could not be done. The empirical reality did not lend itself easily to strict a priori assumptions. A consequence of the “the complex web of voluntary associations”(Kropotkin 1910) is that membership entails different forms of relations in different organisations operating out of different national contexts. The idea of “membership” as an ontologically homogeneous phenomena was faulty- making clear delineations of the network difficult. I chose to sacrifice the validity of the network as consisting of equivalent ties- so as to better capture the observed phenomena. This was advantageous in terms of providing a more accurate description of the humanitarian governance network- but inevitably also compromised the validity of the formal operative definitions of relational power.

Relational power was indicated by the measures of degree- betweenness- and reach centrality. Again I would argue that these indicators have theoretical face validity. The concepts are precisely defined in the measures- and provide the exact essence of participation, brokerage and reach. However, the relations on which these measures were applied were memberships in governing mechanisms. The core concept of relational power was developed through the idea of isomorphic leadership. Highly legitimate actors would be able to influence the actions of others by setting an example. By limiting the idea of relations in the social network to only be delineated by membership, a vital facet of relational power was excluded from the formal analysis. As was seen in the case of MSF's exit from Sphere, an organisation can view another as an isomorphic leader without it being reflected in terms of formal membership. As has been mentioned these measures were also compromised by the fact that neither the nodes, nor the edges, could substantively be viewed as indicators of equivalent phenomena. Humanitarian organisations proved too varied to be adequately reduced to ontologically equivalent nodes. Likewise, the concept of membership proved too varied to constitute ontologically equivalent edges.

9.4 Measurement Validity

The measurements in this analysis fall along two lines of enquiry, the structural measure of the network as a whole and the ego-measures for each organisation. The

implications of the sacrifices made in choosing indicators are somewhat different for the two.

In measuring the structure I am attempting to capture the essence of organisation in the humanitarian transnational anarchy. The ambition is to provide measures that describe the structure generated by “the complex web of voluntary associations would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations” (Kropotkin 1910). These measures do not necessarily demand the ontological equivalence of nodes and edges, only that the data accurately reflects the observed phenomena. The pattern of associations are described as openly as possible in the network- I have systematically valued accurate depictions over a priori assumptions in the sampling choices made. A critique of the structure would rather have to be direct at the edge-definition of the network: where does the social governance network end? The infinite variety is a not an exaggeration. As was discussed in the sampling chapter, it is very hard to precisely define the distinction between a single organisation and a corporate centre with affiliated branches. As has also been discussed extensively in the theory chapter (see Extrovert, Introvert and Affective organisations) it is not absolutely clear whether the central organisations have effective control over their field offices. Choosing organisations as the lowest unit of analysis is therefore not a clear-cut choice, and the network boundary produced must necessarily be defined as a bit blurry. None the less, the described network captures the major governance initiative in the literature on humanitarian governance, and the organisations are those listed as members. I would therefore argue that despite its' short-comings, the structural measures of the network as a whole do describe the phenomenon they sought to describe.

The ego-measures sought to capture the underlying concept of relational power. While the operative definitions of these hold face validity, the ego-measures interact poorly with the data. Limiting the relations to membership, and assuming equivalent initial power, dramatically reduces the indicators validity- and this is necessarily reflected in the measure. The extent to which these measures are useful must be limited to the how they reflected the data they are applied to- and as a consequence the conclusions with

regards to the relational power of humanitarian organisations must be made with strict caveats.

10 Conclusions

10.1 The Humanitarian Transnational Anarchy

The transnational humanitarian anarchy has been shown to be as divergent from the interstate anarchy as was presumed in the introduction. However, they also have a degree of hierarchy- or rather organisation. The “infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and degrees” became a better description of the phenomena than anticipated. The forms of organisation truly manifest in all forms: “local, regional, national and international temporary or more or less permanent.” (Kropotkin 1910) While this was the original justification for the applicability of SNA to humanitarian governance, it also became the greatest hindrance in using the methods effectively. When both the ties and the actors in the network become too divergent in substantive content- the approach unravels. Adding the issue of boundary specification to the mix, does not dramatically improve the situation.

10.2 Social Network Analysis

While the findings of the mathematical analysis proved of limited value, the findings in the comparative analysis were strong. The implications of an anarchy, devoid of violence and commerce, is that relational power as a concept- if not as a formal construct- becomes relevant. The research does not provide grounds for concluding beyond the humanitarian field. Indeed- four cases might be a bit too meagre for any strong conclusions with regards to humanitarian field as well. However, the findings do indicate that the conceptual framework of Social Network Analysis might be applicable to the study of transnational governance. If the study of transnational governance is to progress, it will have to develop an applicable concept of power. While I do not have sufficient grounds for concluding that this concept must be relational power- the study does indicate that relational power should at least be nominated for the position.

So the concepts proved of use- while the operative mathematical definitions unravelled when they interacted with the data. Why the shortcomings? The data quality was, in this case, the primary issue. You cannot generate conclusions from a dataset that reach beyond the actual content. Membership *of* a broad diversity of organisations *in* a broad diversity of organisations- can only produce measures that describe just that. In retrospect a different approach to SNA might have resolved some of these issues. The primary methodological issue is dealing with the problems generated by SNA's assumption of the ontological equivalence of nodes. If this issue can be resolved with a different research design- there might be a future for formal SNA in the study of transnational governance.

10.3 Future Research

In retrospect, there are two approaches which might relieve, if not entirely resolve, the issue. One is to dramatically increase the number of nodes; the other is to dramatically reduce them. The key challenge is that the nodes- at least the nodes at the lowest level- must be comparable. Perhaps the best way to accomplish this is to disregard the idea of the organisation as the primal units entirely. A bottom up sampling method- registering individual field offices, might produce a better dataset. This might also provide a resolution to the boundary specification problem: if field offices are registered from a limited number of contexts -known to be emergency relief oriented- than the network generated from them will necessarily also be “pure” humanitarian. The network could then be expanded, from field office to organisation, and from organisation to governance mechanisms. The substantive content of reach and brokerage would then correct for field presence- and organisations without an active field presence would be excluded. While this does resolve the issue of diverging meanings of membership, it might be a step in the right direction for resolving the issue of node equivalence.

A second approach would be to dramatically reduce the number of nodes. It should be possible to produce an exhaustive list of humanitarian organisations with an annual budget above 100 million dollars. Analysing humanitarian governance- only through

these few organisations- would enable a more qualitative approach. It would be possible to add values to the nodes as attributes- indicating positions on cleavages, funding proportions, the number of countries in which they have offices et cetera. Other forms of relations, such as sharing board members, or having had the same CEO, could also be included. A more intensive network analysis- conjoined with a comparative case study of the organisations- might be more advantageous than an analysis with a large number of nodes.

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Appendix 1: UCINET Commands

*Calculating membership constellations

COUNT COMBINATIONS

Input dataset: 2-mode (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode)
Output dataset: 2-mode-combinationfreqs (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\2-mode-combinationfreqs)

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 22 May 12 14:10:15

UCINET 6.391 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies

*Reversing ties

TRANSDPOSE

Input dataset: Scale free (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\UCINET
data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free)

Output dataset: Scale free-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\Scale free-Transp)

Transposed matrix saved as dataset Scale free-Transp

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 20 May 12 20:47:05

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..

***Operation repeated for each network denoted by "-Transp." at the end of the file name.**

***Excluded measure of Hierarchy**

KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES

Input dataset: Scale free-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Transp)
Output dataset: Scale free-Transp-GTD (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\Scale free-Transp-GTD)

Krackhardt GTD Measures

```

          1
      -----
1 Connectedness 1.0000
2      Hierarchy 0.0000
3      Efficiency 0.0000
4          LUB   1.0000

```

GTD measures saved as dataset: Scale free-Transp-GTD

Running time: 00:00:11

Output generated: 22 May 12 14:47:23

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***The measure is a contradiction as there is only one reciprocal tie in the data- hierarchy cannot be 0.0000 Likewise the efficiency of the network is clearly above 0.0000 especially considering the high number of nodes only connected to the network by a single node. Presumably an error caused by data-overload.**

Hierarchy degree above one

KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES

Input dataset: ScalefreeLessThanOne-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim

U1stein\Desktop\aaasteroppgave\Formal Datasets\ScalefreeLessThanOne-Transp)

Output dataset: GTD (C:\Users\Joakim U1stein\Documents\GTD)

Krackhardt GTD Measures

1

Connectedness 1.0000

Hierarchy 0.9994

Efficiency 0.9829

LUB 0.9856

GTD measures saved as dataset: GTD

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 22 May 12 14:52:36

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*Hierarchy Degree above 3

KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES

Input dataset: Central Network-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim U1stein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Edges more than 3\Central Network-Transp)

Output dataset: Central Network-Transp-GTD (C:\Users\Joakim U1stein\Documents\Central Network-Transp-GTD)

Krackhardt GTD Measures

1

1 Connectedness 1.0000

2 Hierarchy 0.9973

3 Efficiency 0.8831

4 LUB 0.9344

GTD measures saved as dataset: Central Network-Transp-GTD

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 23 mai 12 02:39:54

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***Hierarchy Governing Mechanisms**

KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES

Input dataset: governing-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Governing mech\governing-Transp)

Output dataset: governing-Transp-GTD (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\governing-Transp-GTD)

Krackhardt GTD Measures

		1	

1	Connectedness	0.7583	
2	Hierarchy	0.9697	
3	Efficiency	0.8718	
4	LUB	0.6282	

GTD measures saved as dataset: governing-Transp-GTD

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 23 mai 12 02:41:20

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***Creating Affiliations Dataset**

AFFILIATIONS

Input dataset: 2-mode (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode)
Dimension: ROWS
Method: Cross-Products (co-occurrence)
Normalization: None

To view resulting matrix, run DISPLAY on the C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff dataset.

1-mode matrix saved as dataset 2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)

Running time: 00:00:01
Output generated: 19 May 12 22:28:11

***Scale-free Freeman Degree Centrality**

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES

Diagonal valid? NO
Model: ASYMMETRIC
Input dataset: Scale free (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free)

Actor-by-centrality matrix saved as dataset Scale free-deg

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 19 May 12 22:09:53

***Affiliation Freeman Degree Centrality**

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES

Diagonal valid?

NO

Model:

ASYMMETRIC

Input dataset:

2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)

Note: For valued data, the normalized centrality may be larger than 100.

Also, the centralization statistic is divided by the maximum value in the
input dataset.

Actor-by-centrality matrix saved as dataset 2-mode-RowAff-deg

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 19 May 12 22:36:16

***Symmetrical Scale-free Network**

SYMMETRIZE

Method:

Maximum

Input dataset:

Scale free (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\UCINET
data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free)

Percentage of symmetric pairs was: 100.00%

Percentage of reciprocated ties: 100.00%

$(\#(x \rightarrow y \text{ AND } x \leftarrow y) / \#(x \rightarrow y \text{ OR } x \leftarrow y))$

Symmetrized matrix saved as dataset Scale free-Sym (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Sym)

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 20 May 12 20:50:59

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***Scale- Free Freeman Betweenness Centrality**

FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY

Input dataset: Scale free-Sym (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Sym)

Important note: this routine binarizes but does NOT symmetrize.

Un-normalized centralization: 58228018.247

Output actor-by-centrality measure matrix saved as dataset FreemanBetweenness

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 20 May 12 20:52:44

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***Affiliations Freeman Betweenness Centrality**

FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY

Input dataset: 2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)

Important note: this routine binarizes but does NOT symmetrize.

Un-normalized centralization: 4130014.500

Network Centralization Index = 3.17%

Output actor-by-centrality measure matrix saved as dataset FreemanBetweenness

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 20 May 12 21:17:12

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***Scale-free Reach Centrality**

REACH CENTRALITY

Input dataset: Scale free-Sym (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Sym)

Output dataset: ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)

Output reachcentrality measure matrix saved as dataset ReachCentrality
(C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ReachCentrality)

Output actor-by-distance proportion-of-nodes-reached matrix saved as dataset
ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 23 mai 12 02:22:34

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***Affiliations Reach Centrality**

REACH CENTRALITY

Input dataset: 2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)

Output dataset: ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim
Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)

WARNING: Data matrix dichotomized such that $x_{ij} > 0$ was recoded to 1

Output reachcentrality measure matrix saved as dataset ReachCentrality
(C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ReachCentrality)

Output actor-by-distance proportion-of-nodes-reached matrix saved as dataset
ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)

Running time: 00:00:01

Output generated: 23 mai 12 02:22:34

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